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I. INTRODUCTION
Michigan courts and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals were prolific
in the number of decisions they produced during this Survey period.' In
the main, the decisions were straight-forward and clear, and boded well
for the arbitral process. The decisions either solidified existing law,
which favors arbitration, or refined existing law, offering practitioners
better guidance in terms of tests and standards to use when asserting or
defending against a claim of arbitrability, contract unconscionability, or
award vacatur.
The United States Supreme Court also decided two significant
arbitration cases. In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,2 the
Supreme Court addressed the question of expanded judicial review under
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sections 9-11. 3 In concluding that
expanded grounds of review by party agreement violate the strictures of
the FAA, the Court left open the possibility that parties may seek review
for errors of law or errors of fact-where the FAA is not implicated-by
either incorporating state statutory or common law standards.4 In Preston
v. Ferrer,5 the Supreme Court re-visited the doctrine of pre-emption to
determine whether an interstate arbitration agreement was voided under
the California Talent Agencies Act. Once again, the Supreme Court came
down on the side of pre-emption, strengthening the jurisprudence that
establishes the supremacy of the FAA and sending a clear message to
1. The Survey period for this article covers United States Supreme Court, Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and Michigan Court of Appeals cases decided June 1, 2007
through May 31, 2008. One case, Mich. Family Res., Inc., v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union
Local 517M, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007), not included in last year's Survey article, is
covered this year. See discussion, infra notes 387-421. This Survey article also discusses
key uniform statutes and their principal features and adoption patterns.
2. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
3. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act speaks specifically to vacatur grounds
and provides that a court may vacate an award upon application of a party:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ... (3) where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy ... or of any other misbehavior...
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
4. Hall St. Assoc., 128 S. Ct. at 1407-08 ("The FAA is not the only way into court
for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement
under state statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different
scope is arguable.").
5. 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
[Vol. 55:21
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practitioners that the FAA will dislodge any state law that forecloses the
ability of a party to enforce an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate.6
With Preston, the Supreme Court re-affirmed its earlier holding of
Buckeye, 7 that when parties agree to arbitrate their disputes under a broad
arbitration clause, challenges to the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, are to be decided by an arbitrator.8
The Sixth Circuit published ten opinions representing a diverse
landscape of arbitral jurisprudence. 9 A majority of the opinions focused
6. Id. at 987.
7. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
8. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 984.
9. The following three decisions are not included in this Survey article: Carlisle v.
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, L.L.P., 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
district court decision that non-signatories to the arbitration agreement cannot stay
judicial proceedings and compel arbitration under Section 3 of the FAA); Watson Wyatt
& Co., v. SBC Holdings, Inc., 513 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court
decision denying plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration regarding damages that
occurred prior to executing the arbitration agreement because the arbitration clause was
broadly written so as to encompass claims that arose from events before its execution);
Truck Drivers Local No. 164 v. Allied Waste Systems, Inc., 512 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 2008)
(reversing the district court decision to vacate the arbitrator's award because the arbitrator
was faithfully attempting to construe and apply the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, the arbitrator was acting within the scope of his authority, and the district
court lacked legal authority upon which to vacate the arbitrator's award). The Sixth
Circuit also produced several interesting unpublished decisions confined, by and large, to
labor and employment arbitration. See Appalachian Reg'l HealthCare, Inc. v. Ky. Nurses
Ass'n, No. 06-6470 2007 WL 4269063 *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2007) (affirming the district
court decision despite the district court's incorrect usage of the Cement Division's
broader "essence test" where the arbitrator "appropriately relied on past practice, properly
applied context to interpret seemingly explicit language, and therefore construed the
contract"); Bauer v. Carty & Co., 246 F. App'x 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
district court decision where former employee of broker failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the arbitrator's award was procured by fraud or undue
means. "Disputes [over discovery] in interpretation are hardly unknown ... and are in
fact the stuff of a majority of the motions to compel that find their way to the court.
While regretful, such activity could hardly be said to be 'immoral if not illegal'); Earle
v. Netjets Aviation, Inc., 262 F. App'x 698, 702 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district
court decision where the arbitrator, in denying the union's grievances, properly
considered custom and practice and therefore was arguably construing the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement (c/b/a), incorporated agreements, and Federal
Regulations); Hange v. City of Mansfield, 257 F. App'x 887, 897 (6th Cir. 2007)
(affirming the district court decision where an arbitrator properly found that the City's
conditional termination of the grievant, later rescinded to a demotion, did not violate
grievant's constitutional rights; grievant was able to pursue his contractual remedies
under the terms of the c/b/a); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. ISP
Chems., Inc., 261 F. App'x 841, 849 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court decision
where the arbitrator reasonably construed the c/b/a to incorporate by reference a party
agreement respecting rate structures for employee contributions of medical benefits,
"thereby bringing the matter squarely within the ambit of the CBA's arbitration clause");
2009]
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on the standard of review of arbitral awards, indicating a disturbing trend
that dissatisfied litigants in arbitration are seeking, in greater numbers,
the proverbial "second bite of the apple." In other developments, the
Michigan Court of Appeals articulated a strong admonition to the
judiciary that, "under the plain meaning rule," explicit statutory language
which speaks to procedural safeguards incorporated in the Domestic
Relations Arbitration Act must be strictly followed. 10
Finally, on the legislative scene, several important federal statutes
were introduced, aimed at incorporating standards of equity in mandatory
arbitration agreements which, unlike consensual arbitration agreements,
are unilaterally imposed in contracts of adhesion. In addition to federal
legislation, the Uniform Mediation Act11 received renewed attention, as
more states consider the feasibility of adoption. This section discusses
the central features of the Act, and the nature of the obstacles, real or
perceived, that are impeding states from adopting it as part of a unified
body of law.
Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Workers of Am., Local 174 v. Mich.
Mech. Servs., Inc., 247 F. App'x 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court
decision where the arbitrator, who found that the grievant was improperly terminated by
management for failure to take a drug test, was arguably construing the relevant portions
of the c/b/a); Mich. Sugar Co. v. Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers, & Grain
Millers Int'l Union Locals 259-G, 260-G, 262-G, 278 F. App'x 623, 829 (6th Cir. 2008)
(reversing the district court decision where the arbitrator was arguably construing the
relevant provisions of the contract when he found that the employer had violated the c/b/a
and the National Labor Relations Act by discontinuing health care benefits of employees
observing picket lines during an economic strike); Roll Coater, Inc. v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 215, 263 F. App'x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2008)
(affirming the district court decision where the arbitrator was arguably construing the
relevant provisions of the c/b/a and Rules of Conduct when he reduced an employee's
punishment from discharge to notice upon finding that the parties' agreement imposed a
progressive discipline procedure which required the employer to "not discharge or
otherwise take any disciplin[ary] action against any associate without first giving notice.
. . of the conduct expected and of the potential consequence for violating that
expectation"); Visconsi v. Lehman Bros., 244 F. App'x 708 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
district court decision where an arbitrator's decision did not require a formal opinion
under NASD rules). The Visconsi Court opined:
We pause to note that arbitrating parties are not unwittingly at the mercy of an
unscrupulous arbitrator who attempts to insulate his decision by refusing to
issue an opinion. We must remember that the arbitrator's role is created by
contract, and the very contract that empowers the arbitrator to rule is the same
contract that may demand a written opinion justifying his award...
Id. at 712.
10. Johnson v. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. 1, 8, 739 N.W.2d 877, 882 (2007) (citing
Browder v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 413 Mich. 603, 612, 321 N.W.2d 668, 673 (1982)).
11. Uniform Mediation Act, Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws (2001),
available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
[Vol. 55:21
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II. THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
A. Interplay Between Federal and State Law
Arbitration is regulated by federal legislation. 12 Passed in 1925, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides several procedural mechanisms
to ensure that arbitration agreements are properly enforced. These
procedural mechanisms include motions to stay 13 and motions to
compel. 14
The FAA also limits its application to a contract in maritime or a
transaction in commerce. 15 These limitations, and the concern when
enacted that the FAA only applied to federal courts, triggered the passage
of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) in 1955.16 Today, the majority of
states have created their own versions of the FAA, paralleling their
provisions to those of the UAA.' 7 This interesting patchwork of
12. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). The Act was originally
designated as the United States Arbitration Act.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) ("If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of
the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such agreement,
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement .. ") (emphasis added).
14. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court . . .for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement.") (emphasis added).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
16. Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 1-25 (2006). For background on the UAA, see Peter
H. Berge, The Uniform Arbitration Act: A Retrospective on Its Thirty-Fifth Anniversary,
14 HAMLINE L. REV. 301 (1990), cited in STEPHEN K. HtBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON,
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2006).
17. Michigan's arbitration statute parallels generally the provisions of the UAA. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001 - .5035 (West 2006). In August 2000, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA). The revisions were the first since 1955, when the Uniform
Arbitration Act was initially adopted. The drafters' goals were to clarify ambiguities
under the Act and to limit court intervention, while simultaneously retaining the essential
character of arbitration. Unif. Arbitration Act (2000) at 1-6. The following states have
enacted the RUAA: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (2007)); Colorado (CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-22-201 (West 2008)); Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT. § 658A-1 (2008));
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 38.206 (West 2007)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:23B-I (West 2008)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 (West 2008)); North
Carolina (N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 1.569.1 (West 2008)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.3-01 (2008)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1851 (2008)); Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. § 36.600 (2008)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31A-101 (West 2008)); and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04A.010 (West 2008)).
2009]
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legislation, designed to further the national and concomitant state policy
favoring arbitration, becomes controversial when parties seek to extricate
themselves from arbitration agreements. Despite an impregnable body of
Supreme Court case law holding that the FAA pre-empts state laws that
overreach to regulate arbitration agreements,' s questions continue to
arise as to the proper intersection of federal and state law, and under
what circumstances the FAA will trump state legislation that disfavors
arbitration. The following case illustrates this tension.
In Preston v. Ferrer,19 the United States Supreme Court decided
whether the California Talent Agencies Act (TAA),2° which vested in the
Labor Commissioner exclusive original jurisdiction over contract
validity disputes, would be superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act
and the Court's holding in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.
21
The case involved a contract between Ferrer, a former Florida trial court
judge who served on the television show, "Judge Alex," and Preston, an
attorney who provided professional services to persons in the
entertainment industry.22 The contract between Ferrer and Preston
included, among other things, a provision calling for arbitration of "any
dispute ... relating to the terms of [the contract] or the breach, validity,
or legality thereof . . . in accordance with the rules [of the American
Arbitration Association]. 23 A fee dispute arose, and Preston filed for
arbitration.24 Ferrer responded by filing a petition with the California
Labor Commissioner, asserting that the contract was invalid and
unenforceable under the TAA because Preston was not licensed as a
18. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the
federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration ...."); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of
Tr. of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) ("[E]ven when Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be pre-empted
to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (The
FAA's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration.., and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts"); Doctor's Assoc.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("By enacting § 2, we have several times
said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other
contracts."').
19. 128 S. Ct. 978.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1700.44(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
21. 546 U.S. 440.
22. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 981-82.
23. Id. at 982.
24. Id.
[Vol. 55:21
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25talent agent. The hearing officer stated that while Ferrer had a
"colorable basis for exercise of the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction,"
he was without authority to stay the arbitration.26 Ferrer then initiated
suit in Superior Court, seeking both injunctive relief and a declaration
that the dispute was not subject to arbitration.27 Preston moved to compel
arbitration.28 The Superior Court denied Preston's motion to compel
arbitration unless the Labor Commissioner determined that she was
without jurisdiction to hear the dispute.29 On appeal, the California Court
of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court decision. 30 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, following the California Supreme
Court's denial of Preston's petition for review.31
In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Preston asserted that
Ferrer was required to "litigate his TAA defense in the arbitral forum.
32
Ferrer responded that the "personal manager" inquiry fell, "under
California law, within the.. .jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. '" 33
Thus, the Supreme Court determined that the dispositive question,
framed by Ferrer's insistence that the TAA had exclusive jurisdiction
over the controversy, was not whether the FAA pre-empted the TAA but
rather who should decide the question of the contract's validity. 4
The Supreme Court began its analysis by articulating the
foundational language of the FAA: "A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract., 35
The conundrum posited by the language of Section 2 is which
entity-an arbitrator or a court-should decide whether "grounds ...
exist at law or in equity" to invalidate an arbitration agreement.
Relying on Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Ferrer's complaint in the Superior Court proceeding, in which he sought a stay
of the arbitration, stated: "[T]he [clontract is void by reason of [Preston's] attempt to
procure employment for [Ferrer] in violation of the [TAA]," and "the [c]ontract's
arbitration clause does not vest authority in an arbitrator to determine whether the
contract is void." Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 984 n.3.
28. Id. at 982.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 983.
33. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 983.
34. Id. at 983.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
36. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 983.
2009]
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Company,37 the Supreme Court held that "attacks on the validity of an
entire contract, as distinct from attacks aimed at the arbitration clause,
are within the arbitrator's ken. ' , 38 More recently, in Buckeye Check
Cashing, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the doctrine of severability, and
held that where parties execute an agreement to arbitrate, an assertion
that the contract containing the arbitration clause is illegal under state
law and void ab initio lies within the province of the arbitrator to
decide.39 Since Ferrer never challenged the arbitration clause, 40 nor did
he dispute that the written arbitration clause came within the rubric of
Section 2, the open issue was largely resolved by the application of
Buckeye. 4 1 Ferrer, however, attempted to distinguish Buckeye by arguing
that the TAA did not really foreclose arbitration-that TAA resolution
was merely the first step in "exhaust[ing] . . .administrative remedies
before the parties proceed[ed] to arbitration., 42 The Supreme Court
found this argument unavailing for two reasons. First, the TAA contained
various procedural prescriptions which conflicted with the FAA's
"dispute resolution scheme." 43 Specifically, the TAA granted the Labor
Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide the fee issue, an issue
which was encompassed by the parties' agreement to arbitrate. 44 Second,
TAA Section 1700.45 imposed prerequisites that applied only to
arbitration but not to contracts generally.45 Although Ferrer countered
that the TAA resolution was merely a prelude to other forms of
resolution, the Supreme Court rejected this argument since the TAA
37. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court decided whether a claim
of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract was to be resolved by the federal court,
or whether the matter should be referred to an arbitrator. Id. at 396-97. The Supreme
Court held that the language of Section 4 of the FAA limits the statutory function of the
courts to whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Id. at 404. Since Prima Paint did not
assert that F & C fraudulently induced it to enter into the agreement to arbitrate, the
overarching question of whether the consulting agreement between the parties-both the
execution and its acceleration-was one which should be decided in arbitration. Id. at
406. Although the correctness of Prima Paint continues to be heatedly debated in
academic circles, it remains the law with few exceptions.
38. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 984.
39. 546 U.S. at 449.
40. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 984. Ferrer's brief in the appeals court stated: "Ferrer does
not contend that the arbitration clause in the [c]ontract was procured by fraud. Ferrer
contends that Preston unlawfully acted as an unlicensed talent agent and hence cannot
enforce the [c]ontract." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 985.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 985.
[Vol. 55:21
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specified that after a Labor Commissioner determination, de novo review
could occur only in Superior Court, not elsewhere.46
Ferrer's second argument focused on the nature of the Labor
Commissioner's forum, namely that it was administrative in nature. 7
Ferrer stated that arbitration would "undermine the Labor
Commissioner's ability to stay informed of potentially illegal activity...
and would deprive artists protected by the TAA of the Labor
Commissioner's expertise. 48 This argument had been considered and
repudiated in Gilmer,49 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the mere involvement of an administrative agency-the EEOC-did
not negate the parties' obligation to comply with their arbitration
agreement. 50 The Supreme Court also emphasized that in Gilmer, the
EEOC served as the prosecutorial arm, responsible for determining
whether it would initiate judicial proceedings in its own name upon
reviewing a charge of discrimination. Here, the TAA was the
adjudicator, a role more properly reserved for an arbitrator.5'
Finally, Ferrer attempted to distinguish Buckeye by asserting reliance
on Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University. 52 In Volt, the Supreme Court held that where
parties incorporate a choice-of-law clause in their contract which
implicates procedural rules of arbitration, the parties' choice-of-law
clause will govern.53 Volt, however, was factually dissimilar to Preston
in several important respects. First, Volt involved a California statute
dealing with cases in which a party to an arbitration agreement was also
a party in a court action involving non-parties (non-signatories to
arbitration agreements).54 The California statute was in place to avoid
waste of judicial resources.55 Thus, under the statute, arbitration was not
foreclosed. 56 In an effort to reduce the risk of conflicting rulings,
46. Id. at 986.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 500 U.S. 20.
50. Id.
51. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 987. The Court stated: "[I]n proceedings under §
1700.44(a), the Labor Commissioner functions not as an advocate advancing a cause
before a tribunal authorized to find the facts and apply the law; instead the Commissioner
serves as impartial arbitrator. That role is just what the FAA-governed agreement
between Ferrer and Preston reserves for the arbitrator." Id.
52. 489 U.S. 468.
53. Id. at 478.
54. Id. at 471.
55. Id. at 476.
56. Id.
2009]
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arbitration was simply delayed.57 In this case, however, the arbitration
clause contained a specific reference to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association. 1s Both parties executed the agreement, and
"there [was] no risk that related litigation [would] yield conflicting
rulings on common issues." 59 Second, even though the contract in Volt
expressly incorporated AAA's Construction Arbitration Rules, "Volt
never argued that incorporation of [the AAA] rules trumped the choice-
of-law clause" in the parties' contract. 60 Thus, "neither [the Supreme
Court's] decision in Volt nor the decision of the California appeals court
in that case addressed the import of the contract's incorporation by
reference of privately promulgated rules.",
6 1
The ostensible conflict of competing clauses was previously resolved
by the Supreme Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
62Inc. In Mastrobuono, the Supreme Court construed a contract that
contained "both a New York choice-of-law clause and a clause [that]
provid[ed] for arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers. 63 In order to harmonize the two
provisions, the Court "read the choice-of-law clause to encompass
substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to
include [New York's] special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators." 64 Similarly, the Preston-Ferrer contract contained two
separate provisions-a choice-of-law clause and the AAA rules.65
Specifically, R-7(b) of the AAA rules stated that "[t]he arbitrator shall
have the power to determine the existence or validity of a contract of
which an arbitration clause forms a part.",66 Using Mastrobuono as the
template, the Supreme Court concluded that the California law would be
read to encompass the parties' substantive rights and obligations, but
57. Id.
58. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 988.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. At oral argument, Preston's counsel argued that Volt was not germane to the
case. Transcript of U.S. Oral Argument, 2008 WL 117843 *9 (U.S.). At a minimum, the
fact that the parties had incorporated AAA rules into the agreement placed the
overarching arbitrability question-one of jurisdiction, not intent-within the purview of
arbitral decision-making. Id.
62. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
63. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 988 (discussing Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52).
64. Id. at 989 (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63-64).
65. Id. at 988.
66. Id. at 989.
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would not impact the authority of the arbitrator.67 The judgment of the
California Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded.68
Justice Thomas dissented, asserting that the Federal Arbitration Act
was never intended to apply to proceedings in state court. 69 According to
Justice Thomas, the FAA could not be used to eclipse "a state law that
delay[ed] arbitration until administrative proceedings" were concluded.7 °
This view, long out of step with majoritarian thinking on the purpose of
the FAA, also misreads one fundamental aspect of Preston. The state law
at issue in Preston did not delay arbitration. It precluded arbitration
entirely, since the statute restricted review of the Labor Commissioner's
decision to the Superior Court. Thus, the only way in which the parties
could have arbitrated any issue is if they had agreed to waive the
statutory requirement, and proceed to either AAA or non-administered
private arbitration.
It would seem that Preston, like Prima Paint decades before it, is a
case of judicial efficiency. The primary question presented under the
severability doctrine is whether jurisdiction should shift to the courts,
once a party asserts fraud in the inducement or illegality of the contract
as a whole. For logical minds, the answer is in the affirmative, since the
arbitral tribunal is without authority to exercise jurisdiction. But this is an
incomplete analysis, as Prima Paint, Buckeye, and Preston now instruct.
As one commentator notes, "[u]nder the contract theory of arbitral
adjudicatory authority, the judicial process would always intervene to
decide this initial question, thereby creating any opportunity at least to
delay the arbitration and to undermine the autonomy of the arbitral
mechanism.",7' The severability doctrine counters this prospect, and
assures that parties intent on engaging in dilatory tactics will not be given
judicial support. To be sure, the FAA does not provide any foundational
support for the severability doctrine-it is purely a judicial creation.
Nonetheless, Preston illustrates that the Supreme Court is not likely to
abandon the severability paradigm any time soon.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' dissent in
Preston was foreshadowed by earlier dissents in Buckeye, 546 U.S. 440, and Allied-
Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
70. Preston, 128 S. Ct. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE (Thomson West, 4th ed. 2007).
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B. Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate
1. Common Law Versus Statutory Arbitration
A recurring theme in Michigan arbitral jurisprudence is the
distinction between common law and statutory arbitration. Common law
arbitration typically arises when a provision to arbitrate future disputes
under a contract omits a provision for entry of judgment upon the award
by a circuit court, that is, "to avail themselves of the statutory arbitration
provisions, parties to a contract must clearly evidence that intent by
contract provision for entry of judgment upon the award by a circuit
court.' 72 In the following case, the Michigan Court of Appeals narrowed
the definition of "common law arbitration," ruling that as long as the
magical language-"the award shall be enforced in court"-is embedded
in the parties' arbitration clause, an explicit reference to "circuit" does
not need to appear in the arbitration clause for the agreement to be given
statutory arbitration effect.
73
In Rooyakker & Sitz, plaintiffs were accountants employed by Plante
& Moran. 74 As a condition of employment, they signed a "Practice Staff-
Relationship Agreement" which contained both a client solicitation
clause and an arbitration clause. 75 The client solicitation clause
essentially precluded employees from engaging in any professional
accounting or consulting work provided to the firm's current client base
for two years.76 Breach of the agreement would require the employee to
pay back the firm. 77 The arbitration clause provided that "at the option of
the firm:"
any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, may be settled by arbitration held in Oakland
County, Michigan, following the rules then in effect of the
American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator may grant
injunctive or other relief. The decision of the arbitrator will be
final, conclusive, and binding on the parties. Judgment may be
72. See THOMAS L. GRAVELLE & MARY A. BEDIKIAN, MICHIGAN PLEADING AND
PRACTICE, Vol. 8A § 62C:4 (Callaghan: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 2d ed. 1994).
73. Rooyakker & Sitz, P.L.L.C. v. Plante & Moran, P.L.L.C., 276 Mich. App. 146,
154-55, 742 N.W.2d 409, 416 (2007).
74. Id. at 148, 742 N.W.2d at 413.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 148-49, 742 N.W.2d at 413.
77. Id. at 149-50, 742 N.W.2d at 413-14.
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entered based on the arbitrator's decision in any court having
jurisdiction.
After they executed the above agreements, plaintiffs were informed
that Plante & Moran would be ceasing operations in Gaylord.79 Although
plaintiffs were offered an opportunity to move to the Traverse City
office, they chose instead to remain in Gaylord, and open their own
office.8 0 Several of the firm's clients requested that plaintiffs provide
accounting and tax-related services.81 When Plante & Moran learned of
this development, they demanded arbitration and pled compensatory
damages of $140,000.82 In response, plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a
declaration that the agreement was unreasonable and unenforceable.83
Defendants motioned for summary disposition.8 4 Plaintiffs cross-
motioned, asserting that the client solicitation clause violated the
Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, Section 445.771 of the Michigan
Complied Laws "because its purpose had been frustrated"8 5 by virtue of
Plante & Moran's closing of the Gaylord office.86 After oral arguments,
the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition,
concluding that plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements of Section
2.116.87 The trial court found that the arbitration clause inserted into the
client solicitation letter was enforceable under the Michigan Arbitration
Statute-it was in writing and permitted a circuit court to enter judgment
based on the award of the arbitrator.88 This was tantamount to a statutory
arbitration clause, thus it was deemed binding on the parties.89
The Michigan Court of Appeals concurred with the circuit court and
held that the parties' agreement met the requisites of the Michigan
Arbitration Act. To reach this conclusion, the appellate court had to
distinguish the facts of this case from those of Wold Architects &
Engineers v. Strat.90 In Wold, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that in
order for parties to arbitrate, their agreements must conform to the
78. Id.
79. Rooyakker, 276 Mich. App. at 150, 742 N.W.2d at 414.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 151, 742 N.W.2d at 414.
84. Id.
85. Rooyakker, at 150, 742 N.W.2d at 414.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 151-52, 742 N.W.2d at 414-15.
88. Id. at 151, 742 N.W.2d at 414.
89. Id.
90. 474 Mich. 223, 713 N.W.2d 750 (2006).
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requirements of Section 600.5001(2) of the Michigan Complied Laws-a
writing-and must also require that a circuit court has the authority to
enforce an arbitrator's award. 91 Unlike in Wold, the parties' agreement
here clearly specified that an arbitrator's decision could be confirmed in
"court." The language did not need to read "circuit court."
The appellate court went on to note that this decision was consistent
with a long line of Michigan cases in which courts have held that
arbitration agreements with similarly broad language constituted
statutory arbitration agreements. 92 By including baseline enforcement
language, the parties conveyed their intent to be bound by the arbitrator's
award, an indispensable predicate to statutory arbitration. 9
3
Plaintiffs raised three additional arguments respecting arbitrability,
all of which the court of appeals soundly rejected. First, plaintiffs alleged
that the client solicitation clause was tantamount to a non-competition
agreement that violated Section 2 of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
(MARA). 94 In tandem with this argument, plaintiffs asserted that Section
5 of Section 445.775 of the Michigan Complied Laws conveyed
exclusive jurisdiction over MARA violations, thus submission to
arbitration of any such claims was improper. 95 The appellate court
disagreed, stating that Michigan law favors arbitration. 96 Simply because
a statute provides jurisdiction to the circuit court does not mean that
arbitration is necessarily precluded.97 Here, the parties own agreement
91. Id. at 238, 713 N.W.2d at 758-59.
92. See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc. v. Spence Bros., Inc., 438 Mich. 488, 495, 475 N.W.2d
704, 709 (1991) (holding that "[b]ecause the Spence/Sel-Way arbitration clause provides
that judgment may be entered [in any court having jurisdiction] on the arbitration award,
it falls within the definition of 'statutory arbitration,' and is governed by MCL §
600.5001 et seq."). See also Hetrick v. Friedman, D.P.M., P.C., 237 Mich. App. 264, 269,
602 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1999) (holding that an arbitration agreement was statutory where
it "included a provision for a judgment upon the arbitration award to be entered in a court
having jurisdiction").
93. The continued viability of common law arbitration, which embraces the unilateral
revocation rule, remains open to debate. Justice Corrigan expressed her inclination to
abrogate the unilateral revocation rule in her concurring opinion in Wold, 474 Mich. at
239, 713 N.W.2d at 759. Commending the policy choice to the Legislature, she explained
that the rule applied by the Wold majority was "the last vestige of that bygone judicial
age when arbitration agreements were regarded as unlawful attempts to oust the courts of
jurisdiction." Id. at 242, 713 N.W.2d at 761. Its continued existence "undermines the
well-established doctrine that parties enjoy the freedom to contract." Id. at 239, 713
N.W.2d at 759.
94. Rooyakker, 276 Mich. App. at 155,742 N.W.2d at 417.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 156, 742 N.W.2d at 417.
97. Id.
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provided for arbitration of any and all employment disputes.98 This
clause was broad enough to cover plaintiffs' claims. Second, plaintiffs
asserted that the trial court erred in allowing their frustration-of-purpose
claim to be submitted to arbitration, since this was a question of public
policy. 99 The court did not reach the question of public policy, because it
determined that the closure of the Gaylord office was foreseeable, and it
did not frustrate the purpose of the parties' agreement--"protecting its
client relationships."' 100 Finally, plaintiffs argued that the trial court
should not have submitted their claims to arbitration because two of the
plaintiffs, Lang and Carroll, were not parties to the agreement. 10 1 The
court of appeals rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the
plaintiffs had not raised this argument in the court below, thus the issue
was not properly preserved for appellate review.'0 2 Second, citing the
disposition of Michigan courts to resolve conflicts in favor of arbitration,
the court of appeals concluded that the broad language employed by the
parties imbued "the arbitrator with the authority to hear plaintiffs'
tortious interference and defamation claims, even if [such claims]
involv[ed] non-parties to the agreement."'0 3 "Michigan courts clearly
favor keeping all issues in a single forum." 1
04
2. Consumer Claims Arising Under Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements
It is axiomatic that arbitration is a creature of contract. 105 In the past,
courts have been reluctant to compel arbitration of ancillary tort or
statutory claims, based on the view that arbitrators were ill-equipped to
98. Id.
99. Id. at 159, 742 N.W.2d at 418-19.
100. Rooyakker, 276 Mich. App. at 160, 742 N.W.2d at 419.
101. Id. at 162, 742 N.W.2d at 420.
102. Id. at 162, 742 N.W.2d at 421.
103. Id. at 163, 742 N.W.2d at 421.
104. Id. (citing Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Reck, 90 Mich. App. 286, 289, 282
N.W.2d 292 (1979) (holding that a strong public policy exists in Michigan favoring
arbitration "as a simple, expeditious means of resolving disputes," and that "[t]he policy
in favor of this expeditious alternative to the judicial system is thwarted if all disputed
issues in an arbitration proceeding must be segregated into [arbitrable and nonarbitrable]
categories").
105. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, ARBITRATION LAW 1 (Foundation Press 2003)
("arbitration is a creature of the parties and the parties are free to shape the scope of
arbitration and the procedures to be used in whatever way they please."). See also
STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
(LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2006) ("As arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties,
only disputes within the scope of the arbitration clause are 'arbitrable.').
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adjudicate such claims. This view was reversed in a series of United
States Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s, in which the Court
concluded that the mere fact that a claim is public in nature does not
automatically preclude an arbitrator from deciding it.10 6 Although this
remains the prevailing view, questions concerning statutory claims
continue to percolate to the forefront. In a case of first impression, a
Michigan district court examined the arbitrability of statutory claims
under the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA).
In Revialo Rex v. CSA Credit Solutions of America, Inc., plaintiff, a
Michigan resident, filed suit against CAS-Credit Solutions, a Texas
corporation offering debt settlement assistance. 10 7 "Under the terms of
the parties' [Client Service] Agreement, defendant was to negotiate with
plaintiffs creditors" to reduce plaintiffs debt. 108 On advice of
defendant's representative, plaintiff ceased making payments to various
credit companies.1 09 After plaintiff discontinued the payments, Citibank
filed two separate lawsuits." 0 Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint
with the Better Business Bureau (BBB) in Texas."' Defendant agreed to
refund plaintiff the service fees that plaintiff had paid to secure
defendant's services. 1 2 Plaintiff did not respond to the BBB's request
for additional information but instead filed a complaint in Michigan
federal court, asserting a wide spectrum of claims-"a violation of the
[Credit Repair Organization Act], fraudulent inducement to contract, a
violation of the Michigan Credit Services Protection Act,... a violation
of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act .... a breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and unauthorized practice of law.""13
Before addressing plaintiffs claim under the Credit Repair
Organization Act, the district court focused on whether a valid arbitration
agreement existed between the parties. "1 4 Looking to "ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts," the court disposed of
the conflict of laws question. 1 5 The agreement between the parties
included a choice of law provision designating Texas law as the
governing law. 1 16 "Under Michigan law, a contractual choice of law
106. See discussion infra note 143.
107. 507 F. Supp. 2d 788, 792 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 792.
113. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
114. Id. at 793.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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provision is valid unless: (i) 'the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction,' or the chosen state's law
'would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state .... ,,,117 The defendant's
domicile-Texas--met the first condition. "18 With respect to the second
condition, the district court could not identify "any aspect of Texas law.
that would be contrary to the fundamental policy of Michigan.""1
9
Applying Texas law, the district court initially focused on plaintiff's
fraudulent inducement claim. 120 To avoid arbitration, the party opposing
arbitration must assert and prove that the challenge is against the
arbitration clause, not the container agreement in which the arbitration
clause is embedded. 21  Here, plaintiff contended that defendant
fraudulently induced him to execute "the agreement to arbitrate because
defendant made a series of statements . . . that arbitration [was] not fair
to consumers." 122 The district court rejected this claim because plaintiff
failed to establish a nexus between the statements and "his decision to
enter into the arbitration clause."'
123
Next, plaintiff asserted that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable. 24 The law of unconscionability under Texas law
includes two aspects-procedural unconscionability, which looks to the
surrounding circumstances of the contract's execution, and substantive
unconscionability, which examines the fairness of the underlying
arbitration provision. 125 The district court found that the Client Service
Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. 126 "[T]he arbitration
clause ... was labeled as an arbitration clause and stated that the parties
were waiving the right to a jury trial," and the consumer did not allege
"that he was surprised by the arbitration clause."' 127 The fact that one
party has more bargaining power goes to the question of the contract's
overall adhesiveness level, but it does not necessarily "negate a
bargain."' 12
8
117. Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., 448 Mich. 113, 126, 528
N.W.2d 698 (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b)
(1979)).
118. Id.
119. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 793-94.
122. Id. at 794.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 795.
128. Id.
2009]
HeinOnline -- 55 Wayne L. Rev. 37 2009
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Finding no procedural unconscionability, the court next examined
substantive unconscionability. 129 Plaintiff asserted that the arbitration
provision was substantively unconscionable because the clause provided
that arbitration would occur in Dallas, Texas, the venue of defendant's
business. 130 The district court responded in two ways to this argument.
First, under a Randolph-type analysis, the burden was on the plaintiff to
establish that the costs of accessing the forum were burdensome.'
3
'
plaintiff failed to provide this evidentiary support. Second, and equally
important, the defendant agreed that the arbitration would occur in
Michigan. 132
Finally, plaintiff argued that defendant waived his right to arbitrate,
offering two separate and distinct bases.' 33 First, plaintiff asserted that
defendant's statements with respect to the unconstitutionality and the
unfairness of arbitration constituted an intention to waive arbitration.
134
The federal district court concluded that plaintiff did not show how these
statements constituted waiver. 135 "For the Court to infer a waiver based
on defendant's general statements, would be contrary to the admonition
that waiver of the right to arbitration is not to be lightly inferred."'
136
Plaintiff also contended that defendant waived his right to arbitrate
because of his efforts in settling plaintiffs claim before the Dallas
BBB. 137 One requirement of waiver is that the opposing party incurs
actual prejudice. 138 Here, however, defendant waited a short time, only
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 795. In Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the
existence of large arbitration costs may effectively preclude a litigant from vindicating
her statutory rights in arbitration. However, the burden is on the moving party to
demonstrate that the arbitral forum is not accessible. Id. at 92.
132. The arbitration was to occur under AAA rules. The AAA's Consumer Due
Process Protocols require arbitration to occur "at a location which is reasonably
convenient to both parties with due consideration of their ability to travel and other
pertinent circumstances." Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle 7, American
Arbitration Association, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited
March 29, 2009).
133. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 796.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434
(6th Cir. 2002) (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that a delay of seventeen months between litigation and arbitration was
sufficiently prejudicial to the other party so as to constitute waiver)).
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over a month, before defendant filed the motion to compel arbitration. 139
Moreover, defendant never denied the existence of the service agreement
nor did he deny the arbitration clause. 140 Plaintiff could not demonstrate
any detriment. "Requiring parties to seek to submit a dispute to
arbitration prior to the initiation of litigation would be inconsistent with
the general purpose of arbitration-avoiding the expenses often
associated with litigation."''al Accordingly, the federal district court
found no waiver. 1
42
Having determined that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, the
district court turned its attention to plaintiffs CROA claim. Recognizing
the broad breadth of arbitrability, the district court stated that statutory
claims are arbitrable "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. 143
Such intent is "typically evidenced in the statutory text, legislative
history, or by an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying
purposes of the statute. ' ' 44 Here, the federal court concluded that text of
the CROA did not evidence a congressional intent for claims under the
CROA to be non-arbitrable, finding that the "[t]he language in
§ 1679g(a) is not materially distinguishable from the language in other
federal statutes that the Supreme Court has held are arbitrable." 14
In addition, neither party identified any part of the legislative history
that foreclosed arbitration. "In the absence of any discussion of
arbitration in the legislative history, the legislative history cannot provide
a basis for the court to conclude that Congress intended claims under the
CROA to be non-arbitrable." 1
46
Finally, the federal court concluded that there was no inherent
conflict between arbitration and the CROA, which was designed to
protect the public from unfair or deceptive advertising and business
practices by credit repair organizations.14 7 "[T]he Supreme Court has
139. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. 26).
144. Id. (quoting Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 313 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
145. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 799. See, e.g., Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (Sherman Act).
146. Revialo Rex, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
147. Id. at 800.
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repeatedly enforced arbitration of statutory claims where the underlying
purposes of the statutes are to protect and inform consumers."
' 148
III. DEFENSES TO ARBITRATION
A. Arbitrability
1. Scope of Clause
A major focus of court decisions is the meaning of an arbitration
clause, and whether it encompasses a broad range of claims, including
those not typically assumed to be covered such as tort claims or quasi-
contract claims. Doubts concerning scope are generally resolved in favor
of arbitration, particularly if parties have incorporated a broad arbitration
clause into their agreement. 1
49
In NCR Corporation v. Korala Associates, Ltd.,150 a copyright
infringement case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided whether
"touches upon matters" was the proper standard to employ when
challenges to arbitrability are asserted. 151 NCR, a provider of ATM
equipment, integrated hardware and software systems and support
systems, entered into a software license agreement with Korala
Associates, Ltd. (KAL) in which KAL agreed to develop and license
software components for NCR's ATM machines. 15 2 As part of the
licensing obligations, KAL developed a Triple-DES system upgrade, an
encryption standard designed to make ATM transactions more secure. 153
Subsequently, NCR claimed that KAL could not have developed such an
upgrade without engaging in unauthorized copying of APTRA XFS
and/or S4i software.1 54 Asserting a variety of copyright infringement
claims, NCR filed suit.15 5 In response, KAL moved to dismiss NCR's
amended complaint and to compel arbitration of all of NCR's claims
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 206 and the parties' 1998 agreement, which
148. Id. See Rodriguez de Quias, 490 U.S. at 485-86; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
Accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 280-81 (stating that for consumers,
arbitration as a forum may be preferable to litigation).
149. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983). See also Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir.
2004).
150. 512 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2008).
151. Id. at 813.
152. Id. at 811.
153. Id. at 811-12.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 812.
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contained an arbitration clause.156 The district court granted KAL's
motion to compel arbitration, and NCR timely appealed. 
1 57
Relying on an earlier Sixth Circuit case, Walker v. Ryan's Family
Steak Houses, Inc.,' 58 the appellate court explained its limited role-
confined to determining whether the subject dispute was arbitrable. For a
court to so conclude, the dispute must fall within the ambit of the
substantive scope of the arbitration clause. 59 Here, the parties disputed
not only the scope of the arbitration clause but the standard by which the
court decides arbitrability. 160 At issue was the following language-"any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract . . .
encompasses all claims which touch upon matters covered by the
agreement."'' 61 The court of appeals rejected the district court's reliance
on Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 162 stating that the preferred approach
is to adopt the narrower standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. 163 Under the Court's more recent precedent-Alticor, Inc.
v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh 164 -if an
action can be maintained without reference to the contract or relationship
at issue, the action is likely outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 165 In applying the standard to NCR's various claims, the
Sixth Circuit held:
1. Copyright infringement claim - APTRA XFS: This claim was
deemed arbitrable "because a court would have to reference the
1998 Agreement for part of NCR's direct infringement claim." 1
66
2. Copyright infringement claim - S4i: This claim was deemed
inarbitrable. The appellate court found that referencing the 1998
Agreement was not necessary "to determine whether (1) NCR
owns a copyright in the S4i software or (2) KAL was licensed or
156. KoralaAssocs., 512 F.3d at 812.
157. Id.
158. 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005).
159. KoralaAssocs., 512 F.3d at 812.
160. Id. at 813.
161. Id.
162. 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003).
163. Korala Assocs., 512 F.3d at 813-14; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
164. 411 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2005).
165. Korala Assocs., 512 F.3d at 814. This standard was reiterated in Nestle Waters N.
Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395).
166. KoralaAssocs., 512 F.3d at 815.
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authorized to access and/or copy the S4i software."' 167 "In
contrast to the APTRA XFS software ... the S4i software has no
obvious link to the 1998 Agreement and finding such a link
would require us to draw too many inferences that are simply not
warranted."1
68
3. Contributory copyright infringement claim169 relating to
APTRA XFS: This claim was deemed inarbitrable. Although the
1998 Agreement might be implicated, the Sixth Circuit found
that "a court could determine that KAL was aware of the alleged
infringing activity by referencing some other source of
knowledge. Second, a court would not need to reference the
1998 Agreement to determine whether KAL materially
contributed to the licensees' infringement."'
' 70
4. Contributory copyright infringement claim relating to S4i
claim: This claim was deemed inarbitrable for the reasons
specified above. 171
5. Tortious interference with contract claim: This claim was
deemed inarbitrable because NCR would not need to refer to the
1998 Agreement to establish the elements of the cause of
action. 172
6. Illegal importation of infringing copies - APTRA XFS: This
claim was deemed arbitrable because the claim turned on
whether KAL in fact infringed NCR copyright of the APTRA
XFS software. 1
73
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. "Contributory [copyright] infringement occurs when one, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another." Id. at 816.
170. Id. at 817.
171. Id.
172. Korala Assocs., 512 F.3d at 818. To sustain a tortious interference with contact
claim, NCR would have to show "(1) the existence of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer's
knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer's intentional procurement of the contract's
breach, (4) the lack of justification, and (5) resulting damages." Id. at 817 (citing Fred
Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (1999)).
173. Id. at 818.
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7. Illegal importation of infringing copies - S4i: This claim was
deemed inarbitrable because NCR's direct infringement claim
was not arbitrable. 1
74
8. Common law unfair competition: This claim was deemed
arbitrable because the nature of the allegations related to
confidentiality provisions and the Mutual Disclosure Agreement
incorporated into the 1998 Agreement. 
75
Despite the analytical complexities of Korala Associates, the Sixth
Circuit's decision solidified three primary points of arbitral
jurisprudence. First, arbitration remains a matter of contract between
parties. Second, when parties by choice incorporate a broad arbitration
clause, the presumption is to favor arbitration, absent the most forceful
evidence otherwise. And third, to determine whether the presumption
applies, courts may conduct a tertiary review. This is often a slippery
slope for courts, as they must fulfill this mandate without deciding the
claim on the merits. In Korala Associates, the Sixth Circuit did not stray
from its limited charge.
2. Time-Limitations Bar
In 2006, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Saint Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc., 176 holding that a time-limitation bar constituted a threshold
question for a judge to resolve. 177 This case was one of the few surprise
decisions of last year's Survey period, now set straight by the appellate
court's en banc reversal. 178
Gobain, which manufactures refractory products for industrial
clients, entered into a collective bargaining relationship with the United
Steelworkers. 79 Several years into their collective relationship, Gobain
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 467 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006).
177. Id. at 541. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that they
were bound by an earlier decision. See General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local
Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871, 873 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a federal judge, not an arbitrator, determines whether a time-limitation bar applies to filed
grievances).
178. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Saint Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc., 505 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2007).
179. Id. at 419.
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fired two employees for insubordination.' 80 The union grieved on their
behalf. 18' The parties' collective bargaining agreement (c/b/a) included a
four-step process for resolving grievances, the last step of which was
arbitration.' 82 On March 29, 2004, Gobain issued its formal denial with
respect to both grievances.' 83 Under the parties' c/b/a, the union had 30
days from which to notice the appeal of the grievances' denials.' 84 The
union informed the company of its decision to appeal in a letter dated
May 19 which the company received on May 24.185 The company
refused to arbitrate, asserting that the union violated the time limits
explicitly stated in the parties' c/b/a.186 The union filed suit in federal
district court to compel arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act. 187 The district court denied the motion,
holding the grievances to be inarbitrable; the union appealed. 188
The Sixth Circuit held that the time limitations bar constituted a
condition precedent to arbitration, thus it was a question for the court, not
the arbitrator, to determine. 89 Under Moog,'9" a time limitation
embedded in the steps of a collective bargaining grievance process is the
equivalent of an express time-limitations bar. 191 As such, it constituted a
question of substantive arbitrability which should be determined by a
court. 1
92
In an en banc review, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to the district court to enter an order permitting arbitration to move
forward. 193 Relying on a long line of cases reaching as far back as 1964,
the Sixth Circuit once again embraced the historical rule, i.e., that a time-
limitation provision involves a matter of procedure. 194 "It is a 'condition
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Gobain Ceramics, 505 F.3d at 419.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
188. Gobain Ceramics, 505 F.3d at 419.
189. Id. at 425.
190. Moog, 852 F.2d 871.
191. Gobain Ceramics, 505 F.3d at 423. Both the language in Moog and the language
in Gobain Ceramics included a specific provision that stated that the failure to comply
with the required time limits would preclude arbitration. Id.
192. Id. at 425. The Sixth Circuit proceeded to decide the case on the merits,
concluding that the union had exceeded the time limits required for proper filing of the
grievances.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 419-20. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See also
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (holding that a time-limit
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precedent' to arbitration, and it thus is 'presumptively' a matter for an
arbitrator to decide. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, in the
absence ...of language in the agreement rebutting the presumption,
arbitrators rather than judges should resolve disputes over time-limitation
provisions."'195
The Sixth Circuit found additional support for its position in the
introductory sentence of the ADR provision which stated: "Should
disagreements arise as to the meaning and application of or compliance
with the provisions of this agreement, there shall be no cessation of work
at any time by the matter shall be settled promptly in the following
manner.. .,,196 Finding the language consistent with John Wiley & Sons,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the time-limitation bar was for an
arbitrator to decide. 1
97
The decision in Gobain clearly recognized that the function of the
federal courts is very limited when parties have agreed to submit
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. In most cases,
parties would prefer to have an arbitrator's read on the interpretive issue,
not a court's. The en banc reversal returned the jurisprudence to its more
logical starting point, 198 allowing parties to operate with greater certainty
that absent a specific contractual exclusion, a purely procedural issue
remains a question for an arbitrator to determine.
Despite the Sixth Circuit's well-crafted en banc decision, Judge Clay
filed an exhaustive dissent, in which he excoriated the majority's
rationale. 199 Judge Clay observed that the principal difficulty with the
decision is that it insulated decisions respecting arbitrability from judicial
review even where it is not at all clear that the parties intended for an
arbitrator to determine the subject matter of the dispute. °00 In this case,
because the parties had conditioned the right to arbitrate a grievance
rule is a matter presumptively for an arbitrator to determine). In John Wiley & Sons, the
Supreme Court rationalized that such an issue was a matter of procedure which arose
from a collective bargaining agreement and bore on its final disposition; any other
construction would delay arbitration and would place the court in a position of having to
separate related issues, producing "frequent duplication of effort." 376 U.S. at 558-59.
195. Gobain Ceramics, 505 F.3d at 422.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Raceway Park, Inc. v. Local 47, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 167 F.3d 953,
954 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Moog represents a grave departure from Supreme Court doctrine
mandating that issues of procedural arbitrability be determined by arbitrators not
judges.").
199. Gobain Ceramics, 505 F.3d at 425-37 (Clay, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 426.
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based on strict compliance with the time limits noted in the c/b/a,20 1 and
in the absence of specific express language authorizing the arbitrator to
rule on issues of arbitrability, Judge Clay concluded that the parties' own
agreement did not contemplate that arbitrability claims be directed into
arbitration, without a preliminary ruling from a judicial forum.202
The legal framework within which Judge Clay's dissent was crafted
certainly buttresses the possibility that the majority may have side-
tracked an important consideration in collectively bargained contracts,
and that is party intent, divined from the parties' express terms as they
appear in such contracts. The other salient point made by the dissent is
this-that labor disputes in particular cannot be broken into substantive
and procedural aspects as readily as one might assume because
"[q]uestions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not
arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about
the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by it.
' 20 3
Notwithstanding, the en banc decision in Gobain Ceramics forces parties
to consider, when bargaining contracts, whether a timeliness provision
should fall prey to judicial default rules or presumptions. In the end, the
Sixth Circuit, predictably 204 and wisely adopted a preference for arbitral
resolution of timeliness claims, even though the parties' contract
language may be ambiguous, because arbitrators are not only well-suited
201. Judge Clay relied on the following language of Article 28, Adjustment of
Grievances:
4. Both parties mutually agree that grievances to be considered must be filed
promptly as set forth above after the occurrence thereof. Grievances not
appealed within the time limits set forth in Steps 1, 2, 3, or 4 shall be
considered settled on the basis of the decision last made and shall not be
eligible for further discussion or appeal.
Id. at 426 (emphasis omitted).
202. Id. at 426-28.
203. Id. (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 556-57).
204. The Sixth Circuit observed that every court of appeals has held that arbitration
prerequisites, such as time limits, are for arbitrators to decide. Id. at 425. See Local 285,
Serv. Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735,
739-40 (1st Cir. 1995); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Commc'n Workers, 340 F.2d 237, 238-39
(2d Cir. 1965); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 765 v. Stroehmann
Bros. Co., 625 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1980); Local 1422, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. S.C. Stevedores Ass'n, 170 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1999); Smith Barney
Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Beer Sales Drivers, Local
Union No. 744 v. Metro Distribs., 763 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1985); Auto., Petroleum &
Allied Indus. Employees Union, Local No. 618 v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d
509, 511-14 (8th Cir. 1983); Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesmen's Union, Local 1095,
834 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1987); Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc. 767 F.2d 687, 689-90
(10th Cir. 1985); Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers Int'l Union v. AAA Plumbing
Pottery Corp., 991 F.2d 1545, 1548 n.1, 1550 (11th Cir. 1993); Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. Serv.
Employees Int'l Union, Local 722, 746 F.2d 1503, 1506-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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but often better-suited than judges to answer questions relating to
contract interpretation and compliance with arbitration procedures.2 5
B. Adhesion Contracts and Unconscionability of Contracts of
Employment
The decision to use arbitration is strategic. Even when parties
employ arbitration clauses deliberately and cautiously, there are times
when a party resists arbitration. Resistance is more likely in situations
where the negotiation dance is absent. In other words, if arbitration is
imposed on the subscribing party through a contract of adhesion, there is
a greater likelihood that the subscribing party will challenge arbitration
on contract grounds once a dispute arises. The following cases acutely
illustrate the problems associated with adhesion contracts, which are
generally enforceable according to their terms, unless certain other
factors are present.
In Nance v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,2 °6 the Sixth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether contractual and statutory claims
asserted under a c/b/a were foreclosed from subsequent judicial
determination. Nance was hired by Goodyear as a bargaining unit
employee on June 22, 1998.207 Initially, she was employed as a bead-
builder, "which requires the assembly of steel wires called 'beads' that
attach a tire to the wheel rim., 20 8 Several years later, she successfully bid
on and received the position of "roll-changer., 20 9 While on duty, she was
injured, causing her to take a medical leave of absence for approximately
one year. 2  After numerous attempts to accommodate the residual
effects of her injury, Nance was returned to work as a stock trucker.211
Subsequently, Nance claimed that Goodyear failed to accommodate her
212physical limitations. Her disqualification became official at a meeting
on October 3, 2003, at which Nance, her union steward and two
205. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ("The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to
bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment . . .The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.").
206. 527 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008).
207. Id. at 543.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 544.
212. Nance, 527 F.3d at 544.
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Goodyear representatives were present. 213 Nance chose not to file a
grievance over her disqualification.2 14 She continued on medical leave
due to a hysterectomy. 215 She was subsequently returned to work as a
"Banbury" mixer machine-cleaner, a position for which she had been
previously considered.216 Goodyear determined that she could perform
the job with certain accommodations.217 After four days on the job, she
declared the position unsafe. 218 Nance left work and did not retum.
2 19
While Nance's workers' compensation claims were pending, Nance
received calls from Goodyear, but Nance was not responsive. 220 After
several attempts to reach and speak with Nance personally, Goodyear
sent Nance a separation notice, advising her that she was no longer
considered employed.221
Nance grieved her separation through the c/b/a process. Arbitration
was conducted, and an arbitrator determined, after a full evidentiary
hearing, that Goodyear had "properly treated Nance as having 'resigned
without notice' under Article X of the CBA. '222 The arbitrator concluded
that since Nance had not provided notice to Goodyear, as required under
the terms of the c/b/a, Goodyear had the right to treat her circumstances
as a "voluntary quit., 223 On November 22, 2004, Nance filed suit,
alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Tennessee Handicap Act (THA),
violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), retaliatory
discharge, violations of Tennessee whistleblower laws, wrongful and
constructive termination, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and finally, breach of the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing.224
The district court granted Goodyear's motion for summary judgment,
and Nance appealed. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed two
questions. First, whether Nance was precluded from "re-litigating" her
discrimination claims in a related suit in an effort to vindicate her
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 544-45
218. Nance, 527 F.3d at 545.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 546.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Nance, 527 F.3d at 546.
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statutory rights under ADA.225 Second, assuming that the court had
jurisdiction to decide the issue on the merits, whether Goodyear was
entitled to summary judgment. 226
Nance argued that the district court erred in finding that her ADA
claims were barred by the arbitrator's conclusion that she resigned
without notice, since she was asserting a statutory claim, and such claims
were permitted under Alexander.227 In contrast, Goodyear argued that
Nance's reliance on Alexander was misplaced, since Nance only
arbitrated the question of whether she had resigned without notice under
the terms of the c/b/a, and not the question of whether she was the victim
of discrimination.228
The Sixth Circuit aligned with Goodyear, stating, "we find it difficult
to distinguish this case from Alexander ... [b]oth cases involve the
adjudication of statutorily guaranteed rights, an inquiry Congress reposed
in federal courts. 229 In reaching this decision, the appellate court relied
on Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consolidated Freightways,230 in which
the plaintiff, a discharged employee, claimed on appeal that a prior
arbitration involving the question of whether she had been fired for "just
cause" prevented her from subsequently asserting in federal court the
underlying racial-discrimination claim.231 The appellate court concluded
that there was:
no realistic way to sever the discharge from the claim of
discrimination . . . [i]nasmuch as 'just cause' or similar contract
questions are an integral part of many discrimination claims, the
better rule avoids judicial efforts to separate and classify
evidence offered by the plaintiff under the heading of
'discrimination' or 'just cause.' 2 32
A key point made by the Supreme Court in Alexander, and one
which shaped the decision in Nance is that the expertise of arbitrators lies
in construing the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. In other
225. Id. at 547.
226. Id.
227. Id. In Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., the Supreme Court held "that the federal
policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator's resolution of a
contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII." 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6
(1974).
228. Nance, 527 F.3d at 548.
229. Id.
230. 687 F.2d 140, 141-42 (6th Cir. 1982).
231. Id.
232. Nance, 527 F.3d at 548.
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words, "the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to
the law of the shop, not the law of the land. 233 Thus, "the legal and
factual issues raised in Nance's ADA claim [were] beyond the
competence of the ordinary arbitrator whose primary expertise concerns
'the demands and norms of industrial relations.'
234
The appellate court's second rationale focused on the procedural
differences between litigation and arbitration. Arbitrators are not
required to write opinions, "the record of arbitral proceedings generally
is not as complete as a trial record,, 235 judicial review operates under
tighter strictures, and there is limited discovery and cross-examination. 2
36
Next, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Alexander should be read
to preclude courts from considering a prior arbitration as part of their
analysis. Despite the procedural distinctions noted above, the appellate
court was clear that a district court may admit an arbitrator's decision as
evidence depending on the level of procedural fairness in the arbitral
proceedings.237 In so holding, the majority discounted the fear expressed
in the concurring opinion that providing some level of preclusion would
"license collateral attacks. 238 The court rationalized its decision by
drawing a clear line between an arbitrator's decision, which emanates
from a collective bargaining agreement, and a statutory claim asserted in
court under a federal statute. Contractual and statutory claims have
independent legal origins, which require different judicial treatment.239
Finally, the majority opinion took issue with the concurring
opinion's reliance on Michigan Family Resources v. SEIU Local
517M24° and its deferential standard of review which requires
affirmance of a lower court decision even when the appellate court
believes that "the arbitrator made 'serious,' 'improvident,' or 'silly'
errors in resolving the merits of the dispute."24' Under this standard,
courts would be able to overturn an award only in the most egregious of
circumstances. Importing the Michigan Family Resources standard into
Nance, however, would limit the application of Alexander, which
requires independent consideration of the merits of a civil rights claim,
despite the fact that the claim may have been determined by an arbitrator
under a collective bargaining standard.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 548-49.
235. Id. (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57).
236. Id. at 549.
237. Nance, 527 F.3d at 549.
238. Id. at 549-5 1.
239. Id. at 551-52.
240. 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 2007).
241. Nance, 527 F.3d at 552.
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This analysis paved the way for the court to decide the case on the
merits. Even though the district court incorrectly concluded that Nance
could not assert her statutory claim in federal court post-arbitration, the
appellate court nonetheless found that summary judgment for Goodyear
was appropriate.242 The Sixth Circuit stated that Nance failed to establish
the elements of a disability discrimination claim, including the existence
of an adverse employment determination.243 However, Nance was not
terminated from employment. Under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, "an employee who is absent for seven scheduled
work days or more without.., explaining the reasons for her absences, is
considered to have resigned without notice.', 244 The appellate court found
that Nance was aware of management's requirements, particularly as it
related to her medical leave, since Goodyear communicated with her in
writing during the pendency of her leave.245 Under the ADA, when an
employee voluntarily resigns, she cannot trigger the adverse employment
decision requirement to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
246
The concurring opinion offers the better analysis on the issue of
whether a plenary re-interpretation is justified under Alexander and its
progeny.247 Specifically, the concurring opinion stated that Alexander's
application was limited to those claims of a statutory nature.248 The case
here, as found by the majority, was not a discrimination claim. Under
this finding, the use of issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of Nance's
claim, solely dependent on the application of the terms of the c/b/a,
would not be triggered. 49 Contrary to the majority's assertion that Nance
was not precluded from seeking a decision from a federal court that the
conduct complained of in her grievance constituted inappropriate
termination under a federal statute, "[t]he broader implication-and
presumably, the ... intention--of this assertion is that a plaintiff has a
right to a federal-court re-determination of any finding, even those that
are entirely dependent on the terms of the CBA (and the expertise of the
242. Id. at 553.
243. Id. at 553-54.
244. Id. at 554.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 554-55. The appellate court also rejected plaintiffs' other claims: FMLA
claims (insufficient number of hours to qualify); retaliatory discharge and whistleblower
claims (could not satisfy the "discharge" requirement); and outrageous conduct and
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing (arguments not developed with sufficient
specificity). Id.
247. Nance, 527 F.3d at 559-61 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 559.
249. Id.
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arbitrator). 250 This assertion, noted Judge Batchelder, undercuts
Alexander, and empowers plaintiffs with the ammunition to collaterally
attack "an express holding of a prior panel."25'
The concurring opinion asserted a second and equally compelling
point. Had the parties appealed the arbitrator's decision directly, the
appellate court would have been duty-bound to apply the standard
articulated in Michigan Family Resources, "confining review to whether
the dispute was committed to arbitration ... whether the arbitrator was,
at least arguably, construing or applying the contract to resolve the
dispute . . . [and] whether the decision was tainted by any 'procedural
aberration,' such as fraud, conflict of interest, or dishonesty. ' 252 Here,
however, the majority used the contractual/statutory dichotomy to
conduct the very review not permitted by Alexander, a purely contractual
claim. 253 Thus,
by conducting a de novo review of the meaning and applicability
of Article X of the Goodyear CBA with respect to the
resignation-as-determined-by-the-CBA question, [the court]
allowed a plaintiff to collaterally attack the arbitrator's decision
in a way that contradict[ed] our Michigan Family Resources
precedent, merely by filing a statutory-rights-based claim in
federal court, regardless of its merit, and thus, to circumvent the
deferential standard of Michigan Family Resources on an issue
that is purely contractual.254
In another significant development, the Sixth Circuit ruled that an
arbitration agreement that met the procedural requirement of a "writing"
under the FAA could be enforced against a terminated employee by the
mere act of her continuing employment, even if she did not execute the
arbitration agreement.255 Plaintiff, Lisa Seawright, worked as branch
manager for American General Financial Services (AGF) from 1978 to
2005.256 Seawright was terminated in 2005.257 In 1999, prior to
Seawright's termination, AGF notified its employees that it would be
implementing an Employee Dispute Resolution (EDR) Program.258 AGF
250. Id. at 559-60 (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at 560.
252. Id.
253. Nance, 527 F.3d at 560-61.
254. Id.
255. Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 507 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2007).
256. Id. at 970.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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announced the program through a series of informational meetings and
publications, followed by letters to its employees.2 59 The informational
brochure included with the letters made clear that AGF's program was
the sole means of resolving employment-related disputes, "including
disputes for legally protected rights such as freedom from discrimination,
retaliation, or harassment. ,,260 The brochure stated as follows:
Seeking, accepting, or continuing employment with AGF means
that you agree to resolve employment related claims against the
company or another employee through this process instead of
through the court system.
26
'
Several years after the effective date of the EDR Program, in June
2001, AGF sent an additional communication to its employees,
reminding them that the EDR Program remained in effect.262 This letter
included an informational brochure similar to those provided in earlier
mailings.263 Seawright continued employment until her termination in
April 2005, some six years after the company promulgated its dispute
resolution program.2 6 In suit, Seawright asserted claims under the
Family Medical Leave Act and state law. 265 AGF filed a motion to
compel arbitration, which was denied by the district court on the basis
that "merely receiving information and acknowledging the EDR program
is not tantamount to assent.,
266
The court of appeals re-framed the issue and reversed on two
principal grounds. The true issue, stated the appellate court, was not
whether receiving information was enough to constitute assent to an
arbitration agreement but whether an action-in this case, continuing
one's employment--constituted assent.26 7  Under Tennessee law,
continuing to work was sufficient to bind the employee to arbitrate.2 68 In
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court distinguished the facts of
Seawright from those of Lee v. Red Lobster Inns of America,269 an
259. Id.
260. ld. at 971.
261. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 971 (emphasis added).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 970.
266. Id. at 971.
267. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 972-73.
268. Id. ("Tennessee law recognizes the validity of unilateral contracts, in which
acceptance is indicated by action under the contract." (quoting Fisher v. GE Med. Sys.,
276 F.Supp.2d 891, 895 (M.D.Tenn. 2003)).
269. 92 F. App'x 158 (6th Cir. 2004).
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unpublished case on which the district court relied.270 First, the
agreement in Lee did not contain the provision that by continuing to
work, an employee was deemed to accept the terms of the arbitration
agreement.27' Second, the plaintiff in Lee, unlike Seawright, notified her
employer of her objection to the arbitration agreement.272 Essentially,
Seawright's acceptance came principally from the act of doing what the
employer in writing indicated would constitute acceptance-coming to
work.
Next, the appellate court addressed the question of the "knowing and
voluntary waiver" requirement enunciated in Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc.2 73 In determining whether the plaintiff has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his or her right to pursue employment claims in
federal court, the following factors are evaluated: "plaintiffs experience,
background, and education; the amount of time the plaintiff had to
consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the employee had
an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; the clarity of the waiver;
consideration of the waiver; and the totality of the circumstances. 274
The court of appeals concluded that as a managerial employee,
Seawright was capable of understanding the terms of the agreement
presented by her employer.275 Moreover, she chose not to exercise her
right to seek independent counsel.276 Accordingly, Seawright waived her
right to proceed in court.277
Seawright asserted four other grounds, which the appellate court in
seriatim rejected. First, Seawright claimed that the arbitration agreement
lacked consideration.278 The district court had based its decision not to
grant the employer's motion for summary judgment on the fact that
Seawright "had no ability to affect the terms of the company's policy. 279
However, the court of appeals observed that this fact is irrelevant as to
whether or not there was a bargained-for-exchange.28 ° Under the dispute
resolution plan, both the "employer and the employee were equally
270. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 973.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
274. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 973-74.
275. Id. at 974.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 974.
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obligated to arbitrate the disputes falling within the coverage of the
plan." 2
8
'
Second, Seawright asserted that the mere fact that the company could
alter its policies and procedures "at any time" suggested that the
agreement was illusory in nature and therefore void.282 Although the
Sixth Circuit's position is that such provisions do indeed create illusory
contracts, in Seawright, the employer agreed to be bound by the terms of
the agreement for a period of ninety days after providing notice of its
intent to terminate. 283 This provision satisfied the mutuality
requirement. 284
Seawright also claimed that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable as a contract of adhesion because of the unequal
bargaining power of the parties, and that the agreement was substantively
unconscionable.285 The Sixth Circuit rejected Seawright's argument,
stating that a contract is not adhesive simply because it is offered on a
take it or leave it basis. The court further found that Seawright failed to
establish the final element of adhesion, that is, "the absence of a
meaningful choice for the party occupying the weaker bargaining
position, must also be present., 286 Moreover, even if adhesive, a contract
requires some level of unconscionability for it to be rendered
unenforceable. A contract meets this definition "when the inequality of
the bargain is so manifest as to shock the judgment of a person of
common sense, and where the terms are so oppressive that no reasonable
person would make them on the one hand, and no honest and fair person
would accept them on the other., 287 Here, the appellate court concluded
that the arbitration agreement bound both employer and employee to
arbitration, and that it did not limit the obligations and liability of the
stronger party-the employer. 288 The only point asserted by Seawright
was procedural unconscionability, which goes to the notion of lesser
bargaining power.289 The failure of Seawright to present evidence on the
relative bargaining positions of the contracting parties, coupled with the
reality that Seawright worked for the company for over twenty-five
281. Id.
282. Id. at 974-75.
283. Id. at 975.
284. Id.
285. Id. (relying on Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio
2002) ("[mlere inequality in bargaining power... is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.")).
286. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 976 (quotations omitted).
287. Id. (quotations omitted).
288. Id.
289. Id.
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years, cut against the possibility that she could gamer the required
evidence.290
Finally, Seawright asserted that the arbitration agreement was not
enforceable because it was not in conformity with the writing
requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act. 291 The primary substantive
provision of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.292
The Sixth Circuit concluded, based on the above language, that
arbitration agreements need to be in writing, but not necessarily signed.
The brochure by AGF, outlining the arbitration program, made clear that
continued employment constituted acceptance. This conclusion was in
accord with other circuits, which have held that such a provision satisfies
the requirement of being written.293
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 978.
293. Id. ("It is not necessary that there be a simple integrated writing or that a party
signs the writing containing the arbitration clause."). California courts are moving in a
different direction. During this Survey period, the California Court of Appeals decided
two cases that apply a significantly lower threshold for unconscionability in cases
involving arbitration agreements. In Baker v. Osbourne Dev. Corp., 159 Cal. App. 4th
884, 896 (2008), the appellate court held that the underlying agreement to arbitrate was
substantively unconscionable because homebuilders were not as likely to sue
homebuyers. In bold sweeping terms, the California Court of Appeals concluded without
analysis that the arbitration agreement flowed one way, i.e., that it lacked mutuality. In
support, the appellate court cited two cases-Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d
1165 (9th Cir. 2004) and Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). However, in
each of these cases, the underlying arbitration terms were significantly flawed. In Ingle, it
was not so much that Circuit City would not initiate an action against one of its
employees, but rather six very specific and draconian provisions of the arbitration
agreement that collectively tilted the scales against enforceability. Ingle, 328 F.3d at
1172-73. And, in Ting, it was the fact that the parties' arbitration agreement prohibited
arbitration of class-wide claims entirely-a right protected by statute. Ting, 319 F.3d at
1130. By foreclosing the class action remedy, an aggrieved consumer would have
virtually no remedy, since few actions of the type likely to occur in the Ting scenario
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND FINALITY
A. Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act
1. Expanding the Scope of Judicial Review by Party Contract
To function efficiently, arbitration requires minimal judicial
intervention. Parties expect that an arbitrator's decision will be final and
binding, except for the rare procedural irregularity that could taint the
award. From a practical perspective, arbitrators faced with the prospect
of heightened judicial review may become overly pre-occupied with
"building a record," to ensure that their awards remain invulnerable to
outside review.294 On the other hand, some judicial review is necessary,
given the larger public interest associated with specific cases. This
tension between minimal intervention to preserve the character of
arbitration and the public's need to know was addressed by the drafters
of the Federal Arbitration Act by specifying extremely narrow grounds
for judicial review of arbitration decisions.295
Arbitration is a product of contract and party autonomy. Parties can
choose to arbitrate, or they can choose to litigate. Does it not follow then
that parties can also choose, when circumstances warrant, to broaden the
scope of judicial review provided under the Federal Arbitration Act? For
years, this remained an open issue. In a long-awaited decision, the United
States Supreme Court in Hall Street Association, Inc. v. Mattel,
296
decided the question of whether statutory grounds for vacatur, set forth in
Sections 9-11 of the Federal Arbitration Act, may be supplemented by
contract.
Hall and Mattel were parties to a lease agreement.297 The property at
issue was a manufacturing site; the leases provided that the tenant,
could be pressed without invoking the class action. Id. at 1150-51. Contract law is clear
that the substantive unconscionability of terms is to be "considered in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case.
• . . The test is . . . whether the terms are 'so extreme as to appear unconscionable
according to the mores and business practices of the time and place."' 1 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). This is the test the appellate court should have applied, once it
found lack of meaningful choice. Instead, in Baker, the appellate court focused
exclusively on the lack of meaningful choice, which is insufficient to hold a contract
substantively unconscionable. Baker, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 896. Accord Bruni v. Didion,
160 Cal. App. 4th 1272 (2008).
294. ALAN ScoTr RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, & ScoTr R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 731 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2006).
295. Id.
296. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
297. Id. at 1400.
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Mattel, would indemnify the landlord for any costs incurred from its
failure to comply with environmental laws while occupying the
298premises. Subsequent tests of the property's well water confirmed
high levels of trichloroethylene (TCE), "the apparent residue of
manufacturing discharges by Mattel's predecessors between 1951 and
1980." Mattel ceased drawing from the well after the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality discovered the existence of more
pollutants, and agreed to clean up the site.300 Mattel terminated the lease,
and Hall Street responded by filing suit, contesting Mattel's right to
vacate the premises on the date given and also asserting that the lease
obligated Mattel to indemnify Hall Street for the costs of clean up. 30 1 A
bench trial occurred, and the result favored Mattel on the termination
issue.30 2 The parties attempted to mediate the indemnification issue, but
to no avail.3 °3 The parties then sought the concurrence of the district
court to arbitrate. 30 4 The district court's order contained a routine
arbitration clause but for one clause-the parties agreed that while
judgment may be entered in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, "the
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where
the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous. 30 5
Arbitration occurred and Mattel prevailed.30 6 The arbitrator stated
that indemnification was not due because the lease obligation which
required compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws
applied not to environmental contamination per se but rather to human
health.30 7 Hall Street filed a motion to vacate, claiming that the
arbitrator's decision constituted legal error, a ground for vacatur under
the initial district court order.30 8 The district court vacated the decision,
citing LaPine Technological Corporation v. Kyocera Corporation30 9 as
support, and remanded the case back to the arbitrator for re-consideration
in light of the opinion.310 On remand, the arbitrator corrected his earlier
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1400-01.
306. Id. at 1401.
307. Id.
308. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
309. 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997).
310. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
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decision, and concluded that the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act
indeed was an applicable environmental law, and thus awarded in favor
of Hall Street.3 1 Each of the parties sought modification.31 2 Using the
explicit standard of the order, the district court corrected the interest
calculation but otherwise upheld the award.313 The parties appealed to
the court of appeals, where Mattel claimed that the Ninth Circuit's en
banc decision to overrule LaPine in Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc.,31 4 meant that the parties' expanded judicial review provision
was unenforceable.3 5 The Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of Mattel, and
instructed the district court to confirm the original arbitration award, not
the subsequent award post-reversal.31 6 The district court held for Hall
Street, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the explicit grounds set forth in
Sections 9-11 of the FAA were exclusive.31 7
Through Justice Souter, the United States Supreme Court held that
the FAA provided the "exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and
modification. 31 8 In so holding, the Supreme Court carefully dissected
Hall Street's arguments that the FAA's grounds were not at all exclusive,
"taking the position, first, that expandable judicial review authority has
been accepted as the law since Wilko v. Swan., 3 19 However, the Court
was quick to point out that Wilko did not sanction expanded judicial
review.32 ° Wilko held that Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933
voided any agreement to arbitrate; this decision was later overruled by
Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.32, In Wilko, the
United States Supreme Court explained that the power to vacate an
arbitration award under the FAA is limited and that "the interpretations
of the law by arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law] are
not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation. 3 22 Hall Street argued that Wilko showed that the Supreme
Court acknowledged the "manifest disregard of the law" standard, in
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (2003).
315. Hall S. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1398, 1403.
319. Id. at 1403.
320. Id. at 1403-04.
321. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
322. Id. at 1398, 1403.
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addition to the sections enunciated in Section 10 of the FAA.32 3
Recognizing some vagueness in the Wilko holding, the Supreme Court
went on to indicate that "manifest disregard" could mean a new ground
of review, or it could merely refer to the grounds specified in Section 10
collectively.324
As to Hall Street's second argument, that broad judicial review
should be permitted "because arbitration is a creation of contract," the
Supreme Court observed that this statement "'begs the question,'
whether the FAA has textual features that undermine the enforcement of
a contract to expand judicial review following the arbitration., 325 In
concluding that a textual reading of Sections 10 and 11 are exclusive, the
Court explained that:
it would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated
grounds to the point of evidentiary and legal review generally.
Sections 10 and 11 . . .address [arbitral misconduct] . . .
exceed[ing] powers ... and miscalculating awards... the only
ground with any softer focus is imperfect[ions], and a court may
correct those only if they go to [a] matter of form not affecting
326the merits.
Relying on the maxim of ejusdem generis, the Court struck down Hall
Street's argument by stating that the general terms following the
enumeration of specific terms relate back to the specific terms.327 A
different construction
would rub too much against the grain of the §9 language, where
provision for judicial confirmation carries no hint of flexibility
.... Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and
evidentiary appeals that can 'rende[r] informal arbitration merely
a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial
review process.' 
328
Finally, the Supreme Court placed little credence on Hall Street's
argument that parties will avoid arbitration if judicial review is not
323. Id. at 1403-04.
324. Id. at 1404.
325. Id.
326. Id. (quotations omitted).
327. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
328. Id. at 1405.
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available: "[w]hatever the consequences of our holding, the statutory text
gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds." 329
The Hall Street decision was far from unanimous. Justices Stevens
and Kennedy dissented, stating that the Court's decision ran afoul of the
primary purpose of the FAA and ignored its historical context.33 °
Principally, the FAA responded to judicial animus by placing arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts. 331 The goal of
Congress in enacting the legislation was "to abrogate the general
common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 332  Given the importance of enforcing arbitration
agreements, there would be no reason not to give force to agreements
parties negotiate that provide for enhanced judicial review.333 The case
for such deference was very strong in Hall Street both because the parties
entered into the decision to expand judicial review freely, and because
the district court approved the decision.334
In many respects, Hall Street was unique, because the United States
Supreme Court confronted the question of how parties extricate
themselves from the FAA's restrictive vacatur language. To resolve the
conflict, the Supreme Court focused on the plain language of the FAA.
But, as some commentators note, if parties can contractually "clearly and
unmistakably agree" that arbitrators should decide issues of arbitrability,
why should it not be possible for parties to contractually agree that
arbitral decisions will be reviewed under standards different that those
specified under the FAA?
33 5
Probably the greatest import of the Court's decision was the
evisceration of all non-statutory grounds of review.336 This includes
violations of public policy and arbitrary and capricious decision-making,
which the United States Supreme Court cited in United Paperworkers
329. Id. at 1406.
330. Id. at 1408-10.
331. Id. at 1402, 1408.
332. Id. at 1408.
333. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1408.
334. Id. at 1408-09.
335. Stuart M. Widman, Hall Street v. Mattel: the Supreme Court's Alternative
Arbitration Universes, 15 ABA J. OF DisP. RESOL. 24 (2008) (arguing that the Hall Street
outcome did not resolve the tension between the Supreme Court's prior rulings in
Howsam and Bazzle and the Hall Street appeal. In earlier precedent, the Supreme Court
held that parties could alter by contract the statutory authority of courts as long as they
did so under a "clear and unmistakable" standard). See also Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003).
336. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1408.
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International Union AFL-CIO v. Misco337 as grounds for award vacatur.
In the end, the Supreme Court appeared concerned with the possibility
that parties would flock to litigation after arbitration, and use the hook of
broad judicial review to get in the door.
Hall Street leaves parties with only a few options. They may operate
under common law standards of state statutes; or it is also possible that
parties may seek district court approval of expanded judicial review
before arbitration occurs, and have such review memorialized in the
court's order.
2. Statutory Standards of Review
a. Evident Partiality
One of the more litigious areas in recent years deals with arbitral
disclosures, and the impact of failing to disclose a "disclosable event."
Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),338 as well as
Section 12(a)(2) of the Uniform Arbitration Act and Section 23(a)(2)(A)
of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), provide that an
arbitration award may be vacated for "evident partiality" of the
arbitrator. "The UAA and other legal and ethical norms reflect the
principle that arbitrating parties have the right to be judged impartially
and independently.
3 39
The Sixth Circuit addressed the disclosure question in Uhl v.
Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd. 340 Uhl, an employee of Komatsu, was injured
and later died as a result of a forklift that malfunctioned. 341 His estate
prosecuted, filing a tort action against Komatsu.34 2 The parties
subsequently stipulated to Pacific Employer's Insurance Company's
intervention in the case.34 3 After some discovery, the parties agreed to
engage in arbitration, setting a deadline of January 31, 2006 for the entire
arbitration process to be concluded. 3" In March 2006, after the deadline
had expired, Uhl and Pacific filed a motion to compel arbitration with the
district court.345 After the district court reinstated the case to its active
docket, the parties once again agreed to arbitrate, this time executing a
337. 484 U.S. 29,43 (1987).
338. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006).
339. RUAA Commentary, pg. 42; III MACNEIL TREATISE § 28.2.1.
340. 512 F.3d 294 (2008).
341. Id. at 298.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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written agreement.346 The agreement provided for three arbitrators, with
each party nominating its own arbitrator and the party-appointed
arbitrators selecting the third, neutral arbitrator.347 The agreement
provided that the party-selected arbitrators would be "practicing
attomey[s] possessing experience in judicial litigation, a substantial
portion of which experience shall involve product liability matters. 3 48 In
addition, the agreement imposed specific ethical requirements of
disclosure.349
The parties also agreed that no appeal from the award would be
taken except for a claim of fraud, or if the parties, arbitrators, or their
counsel violated one of the Agreement's provisions. 35 In September
2006, the arbitrators rendered an award of $1.9 million dollars in favor of
Uhl and Pacific.35' Shortly afterwards, Komatsu filed a motion to vacate,
claiming that Komatsu's party-appointed arbitrator, Stein, failed to
disclose his prior connections to the attorney representing Pacific
Employer's Insurance Company, and that such failure tainted the
ultimate award.352 The district court held that Komatsu had waived its
right to object to Stein's service by not interposing an objection earlier
and waiting until an adverse award was rendered.353 Applying a
reasonable-person test, the district court confirmed the award, concluding
that Stein did not violate his obligations under the FAA.354 Komatsu
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.355 Uhl and Pacific requested a motions
panel to rule on the feasibility of Komatsu's appeal, but the motions
panel demurred to the hearing panel because "[t]he arguments raised in
the motion to dismiss and the response in opposition go to the heart of
the appeal.1
3 56
The Sixth Circuit initially examined its jurisdiction to rule on the
case. 357 Uhl and Pacific asserted that the arbitration agreement precluded
appeal beyond the district court, relying on a specific provision of the
agreement that stated, "[t]he award shall be exclusive, final, and binding
to all issues and claims, and ... [t]he parties shall be deemed to have
346. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 299.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 300.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 300-02.
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consented to the Arbitrator's judgment upon the receipt of the arbitration
decision., 358 The appellate court determined that such language did not
strip it of jurisdiction, since nothing in the language stated that the award
itself would be non-appealable, and a final award preseives a level of
appealability permitted by law.359 The court's analysis underscored the
idea that, if the parties desired complete non-appealability, this language
should have been included in their agreement.
Next, the Sixth Circuit turned its attention to the governing law,
namely, which law-state or federal-would govern the ensuing
review. 360 The court determined that since the forum state was Michigan,
Michigan law applied. 361 Absent a particular choice-of-law clause, the
Restatement elements dictated that Michigan contract law would apply
when construing the arbitration agreement.362 In addition, the court
stated that while the FAA typically would not apply to this type of
case, 363 the fact that the parties included a specific provision in their
agreement necessitated a different result. 364 Komatsu's claims and the
parties default obligations under the contract would thus be subject to
FAA case law.365
Having addressed the preliminary issues, the court directed its
attention to the primary question in the case-whether the arbitration
agreement was violated when Stein, the party-appointed arbitrator of
Komatsu, failed to disclose his prior relationship with Johnson, Pacific's
counsel. The provision under scrutiny stated:
358. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 300-01.
359. Id. at 301.
360. Id. at 302-03.
361. Id. at 302. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the current trend embraced a more
policy-centered approach in addressing choice-of-law conceptions. Id. This approach
requires that "Michigan courts balance the expectations of the parties to a contract with
the interests of the states involved to determine which state's law to apply." Id. Relying
primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court recited the
following five factors as relevant to the inquiry:
(a) the place of contracting;
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract;
(c) the place of performance;
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and,
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
Uhl, 512 F.3d at 302.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 303 ("[t]he FAA applies only to written arbitration provisions in 'contract[s]
evidencing a transaction involving commerce' and 'maritime transactions."'); see also 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
364. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 303.
365. Id.
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2. Ethical Requirements. The Arbitrators shall have no financial
or personal interest in the result of this Arbitration. Prior to
selecting the neutral arbitrator, the party-selected arbitrators shall
disclose to all parties any referral agreements, financial dealings,
or other relationships with any of the parties or parties' attorneys
that could in any way be construed as a possible conflict of
interest.
366
Komatsu argued that the above language required the arbitrator to
disclose anything that could be construed as a conflict of interest.
367
Conversely, Uhl and Pacific argued that the first sentence in the
provision limited the nature of the required disclosure to those events
which constituted financial or personal connections.368
The court first examined the import of the FAA, noting that this
special statute provided the exclusive means by which a party could
attack an arbitration award. 369 The only time in which a litigant can
attack the contract is if there is a defect in the underlying agreement.37 °
Although Komatsu's position was that Stein's failure to disclose his
conflict was tantamount to such a defect, the Sixth Circuit disagreed; to
establish a claim of fraud, Komatsu would have to meet the elements of
fraud.3 71 Michigan law states that fraud in the inducement is not
available for a breach of contract term, "lest fraud in the inducement
claims swallow all breach-of-contract claims: '[A] claim of fraud in the
inducement, by definition, redresses misrepresentations that induce the
buyer to enter into a contract but that do not in themselves constitute
contract or warranty terms subsequently breached by the seller.'" 372 The
Sixth Circuit concluded that the Komatsu's fraud claim failed since it
366. Id. (emphasis in original).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 304.
370. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 304.
371. The elements of fraud the court identified include:
(1) the defendant made a material representation; (2) the representation was
false; (3) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew that
it was false, or made it recklessly, without knowledge of its truth and as a
positive assertion; (4) the defendant made the representation with the intention
that the plaintiff would act upon it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it;
and (6) the plaintiff suffered damage.
Id.
372. Id. (quoting Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 209
Mich. App. 365, 375, 532 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1995)).
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was absent a representation of any kind.373 The agreement simply stated
that arbitrators would be free of conflicts of interest. 374
Finally, as to the specific merits of whether the failure to disclose
constituted "evident partiality" under the FAA, the court, relying on
Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continental Casualty
Company, stated that not all disclosures or failure to disclose events
are to be treated equally. 376 To sustain the burden, i.e., a showing of what
a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial,
"the party asserting evident partiality must establish specific facts that
indicate improper motives on the part of the arbitrator. It is not enough to
demonstrate 'an amorphous institutional predisposition toward the other
side,' because that would simply be the appearance-of-bias standard that
we have previously rejected. 377
In concluding that Komatsu failed to establish "evident partiality,"
the Sixth Circuit rationalized as follows. First, there was no financial
agreement between Stein and Johnson.378 Second, Komatsu could not
show, through probative evidence, that the relationship between Stein
and Johnson was "on-going." 379 Third, the type of relationship between
Stein and Johnson was not of the ilk to warrant vacatur of the award.38 °
In support of its decision, the court relied on Nationwide IV,381 where an
arbitrator "served ... for the defendant six times and as an arbitrator for
another defendant over twenty times. 382 In that case, the court held that
the law simply does not require disclosure of trivial business
relationships.383
Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected Uhl and Pacific's request for
sanctions.384 While sanctions are appropriate in a situation where
pleadings are filed wholly without merit and with the intent to harass, it
373. Id. As important, Komatsu was unlikely to prevail on the breach of contract
claims since Komatsu knew even before it signed the agreement that Uhl and Pacific had
selected Stein as their party-appointed arbitrator, and that there was a prior relationship
between the two. Id. at 305 n.3.
374. Id. at 305.
375. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
376. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 306.
377. Id. at 306-07 (citations omitted).
378. Id. at 307.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 644 n.5, 647-48 (6th
Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Nationwide IV].
382. Uhl, 512 F.3d at 307.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 308-09.
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was not shown here that such was Komatsu's intent.385 The fact that the
claim lacked merit was not enough to trigger the punitive remedy of
386
sanctions.
b. Exceeding Scope of Authority
One important case decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
during this Survey period was Michigan Family Resources,3 87 which
resulted in en banc review of whether an arbitration award, arising under
a collective bargaining agreement requiring cost-of-living parity between
union and non-union employees should be enforced. 388 The decision is
important because the Sixth Circuit overruled an earlier four-part test,
articulated in Cement Division, National Gypsum Company v. United
Steelworkers of America, Local 135,389 against which labor arbitration
awards would be measured.39°
Michigan Family Resources (MFR) ran a federal Headstart Program
in Kent County, Michigan. 391 The Service Employees International
Union was the bargaining agent for a portion of MFR's employees.
Under the negotiated agreement, bargaining unit members were entitled
to wage increases, subject to restrictions explicitly noted in the c/b/a.3 92
The agreement contained four pertinent provisions: Article 35(1), which
entitled bargaining unit members to receive the same cost of living
increases as other MFR employees, based on the funding source; Article
35(2), which specified the procedure and the timing of such increases;
Article 5 which outlined the "exclusive method of resolution" should a
dispute arise as to how such increases would be calculated; and Article
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
388. Id. at 754.
389. 793 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986).
390. Relying on the Steelworkers Trilogy, the court of appeals used a four-part test to
guide its review of labor arbitration decisions:
An award fails to draw its essence from the agreement... when (1) it conflicts
with express terms of the collective bargaining agreement; (2) [it] imposes
additional requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement; (3)
[it] is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of
the agreement; and (4) [it] is based on general considerations of fairness and
equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement.
Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 751 (citing Cement Divs., 793 F.2d at 766).
391. Id. at 748.
392. Id. at 748-49.
2009]
HeinOnline -- 55 Wayne L. Rev. 67 2009
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
34, which contained the following langua e: "[t]here are no past
practices which are binding upon the parties."
In May 2003, MFR notified its union employees that they would
receive a 2.5% cost of living allowance from the federal government, and
that the non-union employees would receive 4%; the union grieved.394
The matter proceeded to arbitration where one of the specified arbitrators
rendered an award, resolving the dispute in favor of the union.395 The
arbitrator concluded that the language in Article 35 "became ambiguous"
because the employer had previously characterized its individual
payment and its payment from the federal funding source as cost of
396living. The arbitrator resolved the contractual ambiguity by
considering the employer's prior practice of granting identical cost of
living increases to all employees, thus increasing the union employees'
cost of living allocation from 2.5% to 4%.397 Subsequently, the employer
invoked section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and filed
suit to vacate the arbitrator's award.398 The district court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that by
considering extrinsic evidence, the arbitrator's award did not draw its
essence from the c/b/a.3 99 A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed.4 °°
In en banc review, the court of appeals overturned the panel's
decision, and used its review as an opportunity to re-craft the standard of
judicial review of labor arbitration awards.40 ' Looking initially to Misco,
the court stated that federal courts assume a "limited role" when the
losing party seeks judicial review.402 This role is limited to ensuring
that the arbitration award grows out of a legitimate process: that
the collective bargaining agreement commits the dispute at hand
to arbitration; .. .that the prevailing parry did not procure the
decision through "fraud;" that the arbitrator did not suffer from a
conflict of interest or exercise "dishonesty" in reaching his
decision... and that the arbitration award did not merely reflect
"the arbitrator's own notions of industrial justice. 40 3
393. Id. at 749.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 749.
397. Id. at 750.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 756.
402. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 752.
403. Id.
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The decision in Misco was reinforced several years later by the Supreme
Court's decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n v. Garvey.404
In reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
explained that judicial review by federal courts of labor arbitration
decisions is not just limited, it is very limited.40 5 The "essence" test was
replaced with the "arguably construing" test.4 °6 Thus, once it is
established that the arbitrator is construing or applying the contract, it
does not matter whether the arbitrator commits "serious," "improvident,"
or even "silly" errors in resolving the merits of the dispute.4°7
Guided by the above requirements, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the arbitrator's award should be enforced.408 Absent fraud or dishonesty,
the arbitrator was acting within the scope of his authority.40 9 As to
whether the arbitrator was engaged in interpretation, in other words, was
he "arguably construing" the collective bargaining agreement, the court
concluded that the arbitrator's ten-page opinion contained the "hallmarks
of interpretation., 410 The arbitrator quoted the pertinent sections of the
collective bargaining agreement in his quest "to reach a good-faith
interpretation of the contract., 41 1 The court next examined the language
of Article 35(1) and acknowledged that this clause was silent on the
question of whether parity had to exist between union and non-union
members when the cost of living allowance was funded by the employer,
and not the federal government.41 2 Given the contractual silence, it was
logical for the arbitrator to seek other indicators of meaning, in this case
taking into account the employer's prior decision to characterize both its
individual payment and its payment from the federal funding source as
cost of living.41 3 The court then went to note that the fact that the
arbitrator
chose the wrong path in justifying the award, however, does not
give [the court] a warrant to vacate it. If it is true that appellate
courts generally "review[] judgments, not opinions" while
performing de novo review, it is assuredly true that we review
404. 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
405. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 752-53; Major League Baseball, 532 U.S. at 509.
406. Major League Baseball, 532 U.S. at 509.
407. Id.
408. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 754-56.
409. Id. at 754.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 755.
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outcomes, not opinions, while performing the exceedingly
deferential task of considering whether to vacate an arbitration
award.414
Finally, in re-enforcing the point that labor arbitration is a distinct form
of arbitration which draws its strength from the collective bargaining
process, and its associated quid pro quos of conduct, the Sixth Circuit
stated:
It was the "arbitrator's construction," not three layers of federal
judicial review that the parties "bargained for," and that
delegation of decision-making authority must be respected even
when time and further review show that the parties in the end
have bargained for nothing more than error ... [T]hat is the
import of having a finality clause in an arbitration agreement, the
import of the Supreme Court's decision in this area over the last
47 years and, so far as our jurisdiction is concerned, the import
of asking fallible human beings to make final sense of
imperfectly worded documents. In the last analysis, we have an
arbitrator who plainly was "arguably construing" the contract
and who perhaps just as plainly made a "serious error" in
construing the contract, a confluence of circumstances that does
not invest us with authority to "overturn [the] decision.', 415
It was the arbitrator's error in interpretation and not the application
of a new and refined test that became the focal point of the narrow
dissent.416 The dissent explained that for a clause to become ambiguous it
must first be unambiguous. And, assuming that was the case, the
arbitrator would be foreclosed from bringing in extrinsic evidence to
construe the clause. 7 From the dissent's perspective, it was entirely
plausible that Article 35 was unambiguous and, if so, then the arbitrator
went beyond the scope of his authority to characterize it as ambiguous. 8
It is difficult to determine whether factors beyond simply judicial
economy and preservation of the finality aspect of labor arbitration
awards motivated the majority to reach their decision. In the view of this
author, the dissent provided the more compelling view. The language of
Article 35 was clear-union and non-union members were to receive the
414. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 755.
415. Id. at 756.
416. Id. at 757 (Mertin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
417. Id. at 757-58.
418. Id.
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same payments relating to cost of living allowances provided the federal
government was the source. 419 This clause did not address payments
from the employer. Neither did any other clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. Moreover, the parties incorporated a zipper clause
specifically stating that the arbitrator could not vary the terms of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement and that past practice could not
used to modify explicit terms. Whether the parties' silence was deliberate
or inadvertent, the reality is that there was no clause that spoke to
payments made by the employer. And, as the dissent correctly pointed
out, relying on a past memorandum which stated that the 2002 raises
were being "given on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis," suggests
that the arbitrator erred in construing the contract. 420 As such, the
arbitrator acting beyond the scope of his authority in ascribing new
meaning to Article 35. It was within the province of the parties, not the
arbitrator, to imbue the clause with a different meaning. As noted by the
dissent, "process and reasoning are important, as they provide the
justification and backbone for outcomes ... [a]nd in a hyper-deferential
review situation, as opposed to de novo review, process is often the only
thing we can review.
'
,
421
V. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ARBITRATION
Prior to the passage of the Domestic Relations Arbitration Act
(DRAA),422 judges did not have the authority to order a party to submit a
domestic relations claim to arbitration. The enabling legislation was
careful to mandate arbitration provided certain procedural safeguards
were in place. Because power disparities often arise in domestic relations
cases, the drafters wanted assurance that parties clearly understood their
choice of arbitration, and the significance of an arbitrator's award.423 As
a result, the primary underpinning of arbitration-voluntary consent-
was incorporated as a key provision of DRAA.42 4 The following case
raises the question of what constitutes voluntary consent, a question not
yet frontally addressed in the general jurisprudence of state and federal
courts.
419. Id. at 748, 757-58.
420. Mich. Family Res., 475 F.3d at 758.
421. Id. at 759.
422. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5072 (West 2001).
423. Johnson v. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. 1, 9-10, 739 N.W.2d 877, 882-83 (2007).
424. Id.
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In Johnson v. Johnson, plaintiff appealed from the trial court's
judgment granting the parties a default judgment of divorce. 425 The
parties were married in 1968; in 1978, the parties moved from North
Carolina to Michigan "to start a new life. 426 According to the defendant,
plaintiff was abusing alcohol and pursuing other female relationships.427
In 1982, defendant left the plaintiff.428 Although the testimony at trial
produced diametrically opposed accounts of what subsequently
transpired, the following was established.429 In addition to the six
children plaintiff had with defendant, plaintiff also fathered a child by
another woman.43 ° Plaintiff returned to the marital home, and resumed
marital relations with defendant until he was hospitalized. 43' Eventually,
the parties separated, and plaintiff filed for divorce.432
At trial, the case was heard by a visiting judge (the second judge)433
who inquired about the date of separation and the status of pending
issues.434 When the parties could not respond to the queries, the judge
directed the parties to produce evidence relating to the timing of the
separation and property issues and valuations.435 After several days of
competing testimony, the judge admonished the parties for not
addressing the specific questions necessary to conclude the trial.4 36
Concluding that the plaintiff "led two lives with separate families," the
judge found defendant entitled to half of plaintiffs person for eighteen
years.437 Following this ruling, the parties agreed to arbitrate "the
division of assets., 438 A third judge entered a written order providing that
the division of property would be "submitted to binding arbitration with
each party responsible for half the fee.",43 9 The parties subsequently
completed an asset disclosure form; however, plaintiff failed to
participate in the arbitration, instead requesting a new trial, which was
425. Id. at 3, 739 N.W.2d at 879.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. at 3, 739 N.W.2d at 879.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 4, 739 N.W.2d at 880.
432. Id. at 3-4, 739 N.W.2d at 879-80.
433. The petition was assigned to a circuit court judge (the first judge). Id. at 4, 739
N.W.2d at 880.
434. Id.
435. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. at 5, 739 N.W.2d at 880.
436. Id. at 5-6, 739 N.W.2d at 880-81.
437. Id. at 6, 739 N.W.2d at 881.
438. Id. at 6-7, 739 N.W.2d at 881.
439. Id. at 7, 739 N.W.2d at 881.
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denied. 440 The first judge entered a default judgment of divorce, and
plaintiff appealed.44'
The Michigan Court of Appeals initially examined the language of
the Domestic Relations Arbitration Act, which contains procedural
protections. Parties may agree to binding arbitration, provided the
following requirements are met: each party must agree in writing that
they have been advised that arbitration is voluntary and binding, and the
right of appeal is limited; arbitration does not apply in cases of domestic
violence; arbitration may not be appropriate in all cases; the arbitrator's
powers and duties must be carefully delineated; during arbitration, the
arbitrator will decide the issue and the court will enforce the arbitrator's
decision on the issues; a party may consult with an attorney before
entering into arbitration and may also choose to be represented by an
attorney during the entire process of arbitration; if a party cannot afford
an attorney, the party is able to seek free legal service; and a party to
arbitration is responsible, either solely or jointly with other parties, to
pay for the cost of the arbitration, including arbitrator's compensation." 2
Here, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the "mandatory pre-
arbitration disclosures were not satisfied." 443 When the property issues
were submitted to arbitration, the second judge did not inform the parties
that their right of judicial review would be curtailed. 4" The Court of
Appeals also found that the parties' decision to voluntarily submit the
dispute to arbitration was suspect, given the court's "admonishment to
the parties that the case would be resolved the next day." 445 "Under these
circumstances, the first judge erred in allowing the default judgment
premised on plaintiffs failure to participate in arbitration when he was
not advised of the statutory criteria for voluntary submission.,
446
Arbitration pundits will appreciate the commentary found in Judge
Murray's dissent, which acknowledged the "tortured" history of the
case. 447 Judge Murray indicated, based on the record, that plaintiff had
been put on notice that the court had executed two separate orders for
arbitration. 448 Neither order contained objections or exceptions to the
scope of arbitrable issues. 449 Recognizing the possibility that full
440. Id.
441. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. at 7, 739 N.W.2d at 881.
442. Id. at 8-9, 739 N.W.2d at 882.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 10, 739 N.W.2d at 883.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. at 19, 739 N.W.2d at 887-88.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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compliance of DRAA requisites had not been achieved, the parties
simply were not free to ignore the order of the court. 450 It is not clear-
though colorable-that Judge Murray's opinion derives not necessarily
from his belief that the decision to arbitrate was voluntary, as required by
DRAA, but that the parties should not be permitted with impunity to
disobey a court order.45'
Michigan courts continue to abide by the notion that arbitration, as a
process in derogation of the common law, requires consent.45 2 This is
even more apparent in Johnson, where despite a trial marked by widely
divergent views of what transpired, the Michigan Court of Appeals
concluded that there must be full compliance with the requisites of the
DRAA, or risk setting aside the results of arbitration, no matter how
well-justified the decision.453 To be sure, the DRAA does not collide
with the Michigan Arbitration Act in terms of the consent required to
invoke arbitration. While courts have not ruled on what in fact
constitutes "voluntary," what emerges from this interesting
jurisprudential landscape is the recognition that when a question as to
"voluntary" arises, courts will become more circumspect. In the domestic
relations arena, even more scrutiny is commanded.
VI. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
A. RUAA Developments
The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), approved by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955, was passed by the
Michigan State Legislature in 1961. The UAA, like the FAA, was passed
to ensure the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements under
state law. With the expansion of arbitration and an increase in court-
annexed arbitration proceedings, commentators have expressed the need
for an updated statute that would codify nearly five decades of case law.
In 2000, the Commissioners enacted the Revised Uniform Arbitration
450. Id.
451. "A party is not entitled to ignore or disobey a court order simply on the belief that
the order was invalid and would be overturned on appeal." Id. (relying on In Re Contempt
of Dudzinski, 257 Mich. App. 96, 110, 667 N.W.2d 68 (2003)).
452. The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that "a party cannot be required to
arbitrate an issue which he has not agreed to submit to arbitration... [and] a party cannot
be required to arbitrate when it is not legally or factually a party to the agreement." See
St. Clair Prosecutor v. American Fed. of State, County and Mun. Employees, 425 Mich.
204, 388 N.W.2d 231 (1986) (quoted with approval in Hetrick v. Friedman, 237 Mich.
App. 264, 602 N.W.2d 583 (1999)).
453. Johnson, 276 Mich. App. at 2, 10-11, 739 N.W.2d at 879, 883.
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Act (RUAA), which is a far more detailed and comprehensive statute
than the UAA. At the present time, the RUAA has been adopted in 12
states and the District of Columbia.4 54 Five other states have introduced
bills to adopt it: Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Arizona, and
Pennsylvania.455
Organizations which have endorsed the RUAA include the American
Arbitration Association, Jams/Endispute, National Arbitration Forum,
Association for Conflict Resolution [formerly SPIDR], the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and the ABA House of Delegates.
B. The Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 and Similar Legislation
Several other bills of a similar nature were introduced in 2007 and
2008. These include the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 and the
Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration and Automobile Fairness Acts of
2008. The Arbitration Fairness Act, introduced as Senate Bill 1782 and
House Resolution 3010 on July 12, 2007, states that under certain
situations no pre-dispute arbitration agreement requiring arbitration shall
be valid or enforceable.456 These situations include (1) employment,
consumer, or franchise disputes, and (2) disputes arising under any
statute intended to protect civil rights or regulate contracts or transactions
between parties of unequal bargaining power.457
Further, the Act declares that the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate shall be determined by a court, under federal law, rather than an
arbitrator.458 Determination of arbitrability under the Act resides with the
courts irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges
the agreement specifically or in conjunction with other contract terms. 45 9
454. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (2007)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-22-201 (West 2008)); Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT. § 658A-1 (2008)); Nevada (NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 38.206 (West 2007)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23B-1 (West
2008)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 (West 2008)); North Carolina (N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1.569.1 (West 2008)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.3-01
(2008)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1851 (West 2008)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §
36.600 (2008)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31A-101 (2008)); Washington (WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04A.010 (West 2008)).
455. Arizona (H.R. 2825, 47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (AZ 2006)); Connecticut (H.B.
5531); Massachusetts (H.R. 1813 (Mass. 2007)); New York (SB4148/AB7826);
Pennsylvania (H.R. 1625 (Penn. 2007)).
456. S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4, H. Res. 3010, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
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Notably, the Act exempts arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements.46 °
On December 12' h, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution held hearings. In the House, the
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held hearings on
October 25, 2007. On July 15, 2008, the Subcommittee held a mark-up
session and forwarded the Bill to the full committee via voice vote.
In a more specific effort aimed at reform, the Fairness in Nursing
Home Arbitration Act was introduced in the Senate on April 9, 2008 as
Senate Bill 2838.461 It provides that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
between a long-term care facility and a resident (or someone acting on
the resident's behalf) shall not be valid or specifically enforceable.462
Joint hearings were held June 18, 2008 with the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights. An identical bill, House Resolution 6126, was
introduced in the House on May 22, 2008.463 Eventually referred to the
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, hearings were
held and the Subcommittee forwarded the measure for consideration by
the Full Committee on July 15, 2008. On July 30, the Committee held a
mark-up session, and ordered the bill to be reported for full house
consideration.
Another specific reform, the Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act of
2008 was introduced in the House on February 7, 2008 as House
Resolution 5312 .464 The bill amends federal arbitration law to require
that controversies arising out of motor vehicle consumer sales or lease
contracts, including refusals to perform, may only be settled by
arbitration if all parties agree to it in writing after the controversy
arises.4 65 The Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
held hearings on March 6, 2008 and forwarded the bill by voice vote to
the full committee for consideration. There are currently no similar bills
pending in the Senate.
As of this writing, the bill resides in the Committee on the Judiciary.
460. Id.
461. S. 2838, 110th Cong. (2008).
462. Id.
463. H. Res. 6161, 110th Cong. (2008).
464. H. Res. 5312, 110th Cong. (2008).
465. Id.
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C. The Uniform Mediation Act
Over the last several decades the United States has experienced a
marked increase in the use of mediation as a preferred means of
resolving disputes. 466 The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) 467 was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 2001. The Act is designed to provide:
Certainty: With one comprehensive law for privileges and
confidentiality in mediation, the process gains the certainty that
comes from a single authority and not multiple complex sources.
Privacy: The Act's central purpose is to provide a privilege that
assures confidentiality. Mediators and participants receive a
privilege of confidentiality that prohibits what is said during
mediation from being used in later legal proceedings.
Privilege Exceptions: Exceptions include threats of bodily harm
or other violent crime, attempts to use mediation to plan or
commit a crime, when information is needed in instances of
allegations of child abuse, or for complaints of mediator
misconduct.
Party Protection: The Act requires the mediator to disclose
known conflicts of interest, and the mediator's qualifications.
Exceptions: The UMA does not apply to collective bargaining
disputes, some judicial settlement conferences, or mediation
involving parties who are all minors.
Uniformity: The UMA provides firm assurance that a mediation
is privileged by creating uniformity across state lines. This also
aids in cross-jurisdictional mediations, where the parties cannot
be assured of the reach of the home state's confidentiality
provisions. There is considerable debate regarding the benefits of
466. Scott H. Hughs, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85
MARQ. L. REV. 9, 15-17 (2001).
467. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/-
2003finaldraft.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
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uniformity amongst the states and whether the UMA achieves its
goals of uniformity and confidentiality.468
The UMA ultimately received the support of the "American Bar
Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), most major dispute resolution professional
organizations and service providers, and many if not most leading
dispute scholars. 469 Since 2001, ten states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the Act.47°
D. The Michigan Foreclosure Act
In response to the foreclosure crisis, Michigan House Bill number
6236 was introduced on June 12, 2008.471 In effect, the bill mandates
mediation prior to foreclosure of a private mortgage; in order to foreclose
on a private mortgage: the plaintiff must send notice to the mortgagor no
earlier than sixty days after the mortgage becomes delinquent;
foreclosure is delayed if the mortgagor has a face-to-face meeting within
thirty days of the date of the notice with the person who sent it and a
HUD or MSHDA Certified Credit Counseling Agency; after the thirty
day period following notice to the mortgagor, any unresolved issues must
be discussed in mediation facilitated by an approved Michigan
foreclosure mediator; the mediation must begin within sixty days of the
temporary stay; and mediation fees shall be shared between the
parties.472
The legislation is designed to provide a list of approved Michigan
foreclosure mediators who are qualified under Michigan Court Rule
2.411 and who have also completed required foreclosure avoidance
mediation training.473 On June 12, 2008, House Bill 6232 was referred to
the Committee on Banking and Finance.
468. Brian D. Shannon, Dancing with the One that "Brung Us "-Why the Texas ADR
Community Has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 197, 204 (2003).
469. Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the
UMA, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 99, 100 (2003).
470. District of Columbia (D.C. CODE §§ 16-4201-16-4213 (2006)), Idaho (IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 9-813 (West 2008)), Illinois (710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/11-35/99 (2004)),
Iowa (IOWA CODE §§ 679C.101-. 115 (2008)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2930-25-
2942 (2008)) New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:23C-1 to 2A:23C-13 (West 2004)), Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.01-.10 (West 008)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. 78-31c-
101-114 (1953)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5711-5723 (West 2008)), and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.07.010-.904 (2006)).
471. H.R. 6236, 94th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Mich. 2008).
472. H.R. 6236, 94th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. §§ 3116-3205 (Mich. 2008).
473. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This past year produced an interesting array of decisions in many
different sectors-commercial, employment, labor, and domestic
relations. In virtually all decisions, courts continued to express their
support for arbitration as a viable and flexible alternative to the litigation
process. And, at least in the labor sector, arbitration continues to be the
only process of resort for parties in conflict. The tenor of this year's
Survey decisions confirms that the trend toward wider embrace of
arbitration, sparked by the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of
decades earlier and now reinforced by the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act, will not abate any time soon.
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